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AVIATION LAW DEVELOPMENTS
I. EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. RAILWAY LABOR ACT
THE CASE OF Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v.
Trans World Airlines' revolved around the question of
whether a labor dispute between the two parties should enter
arbitration. For many years, the parties had carried on their re-
lationship based on a collective bargaining agreement that fixed
the rate of pay and working conditions of flight attendants at
Trans World Airlines (TWA). In 1989, however, a dispute arose
regarding the firing of a flight attendant by TWA. A settlement
of the grievance filed by the flight attendant was arranged be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant. However, the flight at-
tendant refused to go through with the settlement and
instituted her own cause of action against TWA. Subsequently,
TWA withdrew its offer of settlement of the agreement.
The union then filed a declaratory judgment action seeking
to force the defendant to arbitrate the grievance, arguing that
the grievance remained unresolved. The defendant argued that
the grievance was settled and, thus, there was no grievance to
arbitrate. The court stated, "[t]he parties' dispute is whether
the grievance was settled or not. The issue for this [c]ourt to
decide is whether this [c]ourt has jurisdiction to resolve the dis-
pute or whether the System Board of Adjustment has exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the dispute (via arbitration)."2
In resolving the dispute, the court looked to the Railway La-
bor Act (RLA), which was created to "promote stability in labor-
management relations by providing a comprehensive framework
for resolving labor disputes."3 The RLA classified disputes as
either major or minor. Major disputes related to the creation or
modification of collective bargaining agreements, while minor
disputes sought to enforce the rights already present in collec-
tive bargaining agreements. Section 184 of the RLA provides
that minor disputes are subject to compulsory and binding arbi-
tration before the System Board of Adjustment.4 The court
found that the parties were disputing whether the flight attend-
ant's agreement was settled in accordance with the collective
1 918 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
2 Id. at 295.
s Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994).
4 See 45 U.S.C. § 84 (1995).
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bargaining agreement. Thus, the court found the dispute to be
a minor one and ordered the matter to proceed to arbitration.5
In Shafii v. British Airways, PLC,6 a reservation sales agent with
British Airways in New York brought a criminal harassment
claim against his supervisor. The parties reached an agreement
through mediation. However, the airline transferred him to a
new work area, later suspended him, and ultimately fired him.
As he was required to do by collective bargaining agreement,
the plaintiff filed a grievance challenging his termination.
Plaintiff then filed a complaint against British Airways in the
New York State Supreme Court, Queens County, in which he
claimed that he was transferred and ultimately fired in retalia-
tion for his filing the criminal harassment charge. He also
claimed that the airline's decision to fire him was in violation of
the mediation agreement in which the airline had agreed "not
to pursue any claims" related to the harassment charge.7 Lastly,
he claimed he had been slandered and defamed.
The lower court found that this action was preempted by the
RLA. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed stating,
"[t]he standard for determining when a state claim is pre-
empted by the RLA is simply and clearly stated: '[W]here the
resolution of a state-law claim depends on an interpretation of
the collective-bargaining agreement, the claim is preempted."' 8
The court concluded that none of the claims required an inter-
pretation of the collective bargaining agreement, and further-
more, none of the claims were grounded on rights and
obligations that existed independently of the collective bargain-
ing agreement.9 Thus, the court ruled that the plaintiffs claims
existed independently of the collective bargaining agreement
and remanded the entire action to the state courts.10
In Burgos v. Executive Air, Inc.," the issue was whether the
plaintiffs state law claims were preempted by the RLA. The
plaintiff, a former airline flight attendant, brought suit under
Puerto Rico's labor laws, alleging that her former employer, Ex-
ecutive Air, failed to compensate her for overtime. The defend-
ant maintained that the RLA preempted a plaintiffs state action
5 See Independent Fed'n, 918 F. Supp. at 296.
6 83 F.3d 566 (2d Cir. 1996).
7 See id. at 568.
8 Id. at 569-70 (quoting Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 261).
9 See id. at 570.
10 See id.
11 914 F. Supp. 792 (D.P.R. 1996).
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because the conflict was a so-called "minor dispute" for which
the federal arbitration process was the exclusive recourse, pre-
empting state law actions. However, the plaintiff maintained
that the RLA should not preempt her challenge because the
state law claim she asserted did not directly involve the terms of
a collective bargaining agreement.
In resolving this issue, the court stated, "plaintiff's status
under Puerto Rico law depends upon the interaction of three
separate articles of the CBA [(collective bargaining agree-
ment) ]."2 Because the dispute concerned the interpretation of
a collective bargaining agreement, and as such was a minor dis-
pute, the court found that the state law causes of action were
preempted. "
The litigation in Pyles v. United Airlines, Inc.14 evolved out of
the sale of Boeing 747 aircraft and European routes from Pan
Am to United Airlines in 1990. Agreements were made between
the two companies to transfer Pan Am flight crews to United
Airlines in order to minimize the potential job losses that the
agreement would cause. United made two separate agreements,
one with Pan Am as part of the sale, and one with the Airline
Pilots Association (ALPA) regarding the standards and condi-
tions of the transfer of the flight crews. The plaintiff in this case
was a pilot with Pan Am who was to be part of a crew transfer
from Pan Am to United. However, one of the conditions that
United made with Pan Am and ALPA was that United would be
able to use its normal hiring procedures and standards and that
any applicants would have to pass United's flight medical exami-
nation. The plaintiff underwent a physical examination and
failed because he had radial keratotomy surgery on his eyes four
years earlier.
Plaintiff brought three state law claims. The first was a breach
of the route purchase agreements between Pan Am and United.
The second was a breach of the letter of agreement between
United and ALPA, and the third was a claim that United had
tortiously interfered with the business relationship between the
plaintiff and Pan Am.
The court dismissed plaintiff's first claim because Pan Am and
United had expressly set out that there would be no third-party
beneficiaries to their agreements. The court found that for the
12 Id. at 796.
is See id. at 797.
14 79 F.3d 1046 (11th Cir. 1996).
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plaintiff to prevail on his tortious interference allegation, he
must establish the following: (1) the existence of a business rela-
tionship under which he had legal rights; (2) knowledge by
United of such a relationship; (3) an intentional and unjustified
interference with his relationship by United; and (4) damage to
the plaintiff.15 The court found no factual basis for sustaining
the third or fourth elements and dismissed plaintiffs third
claim. 16
The court dismissed the plaintiff's second claim because it was
preempted by the RLA. The court stated, "it has long been the
rule that when the resolution of a state-law claim, such as the
breach of contract claim here, requires an interpretation of the
CBA [(collective bargaining agreement)], the claim is pre-
empted and must be submitted to arbitration before a system
board of adjustment."17
The case of Association of Flight Attendants v. United Airlines,
Inc.18 involved a court's jurisdiction to hear a collective bargain-
ing dispute. When United Airlines acquired Air Wisconsin, the
Association of Flight Attendants (AFA) demanded that the Air
Wisconsin flights be staffed only by flight attendants on United
Airlines system's seniority list under the terms and conditions of
the AFA-United's collective bargaining agreement, notwith-
standing the AFA-Air Wisconsin collective bargaining agree-
ment. When United refused, the AFA filed a grievance.
The AFA pointed to a side letter agreement drafted in 1986
for the source of United's contractual obligation. The agree-
ment provided, in part, that neither United Airlines nor any suc-
cessor, assign, or subsidiary would conduct any commercial
flight operations of the type historically performed by United
Airlines flight attendants unless it performed such work with
flight attendants on the United Airlines system's seniority list.
In response, United asserted that the AFA's claim fell within the
National Mediation Board's exclusive jurisdiction. The AFA
sought an order in the district court to compel United to arbi-
trate a scope clause claim before a System Board of Adjustment.
The key to this dispute was the court's characterization of it
under the RLA. The AFA claimed that it was a "minor" dispute,
while United claimed that it was a "representation dispute." A
15 See id. at 1049.
16 See id.
17 Id. at 1050.
18 71 F.3d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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minor dispute would be submitted to arbitration. The represen-
tation issue, on the other hand, was within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the National Mediation Board (NMB). United claimed
the issue was a representation matter because, "the 'NMB must
first resolve the question of whether previously separate carriers
have in fact combined to form a single carrier and whether the
employee groups at each carrier should therefore be
combined." 19
The court distinguished the cases United cited and the cir-
cumstances of the case at issue. United relied on cases in which
two airlines merged, and their employees were represented by
different unions. The court found that in the current case, the
two groups of employees were represented by the same union,
"so there [was] no question as to the identity of the exclusive
representative." 20 The remaining question was whether the dis-
trict court's order interfered legally or practically with the
NMB's capacity to determine whether the flight attendants of
both airlines constituted one or separate classes of employee
groups. The court of appeals decided that the order of the dis-
trict court did not interfere with the board's function because
the board was free to make its own determination as to the sta-
tus of the particular employee groups or classes.2 1 The court
thus held that the matter should proceed to arbitration.
The plaintiffs in Pilkington v. United Airlines, Inc.22 were re-
placement pilots hired by United during a strike against it in
1985. The employment agreement made between United and
the replacement pilots provided that United would support the
replacement pilots in the event of any difficulties with the re-
turning pilots after the strike.
When the plaintiffs encountered harassment after the strike
and received no help from United's management in stopping
the harassment, they filed a complaint asserting five causes of
action: (1) a violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO); (2) tortious interference with the
contract claim against the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA); (3)
tortious interference with the business relationships claim
against the ALPA; (4) a breach of contract claim against United;
and (5) a fraudulent misrepresentation claim against United.
19 Id. at 918 (citation omitted).
20 Id. at 919.
21 See id. at 919.
22.921 F. Supp. 740 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
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The court dismissed the RICO count because it was time
barred. A civil RICO claim must be brought within four years of
the time that the cause of action accrues. 3 The court found
that the plaintiffs knew and were clearly aware of the harassment
more than four years before filing their lawsuit.24
In addressing the state law claims against United and the
ALPA, the court looked to the RLA preemption standard. The
court stated, "where interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement is required to adequately address and resolve a dis-
pute, federal law must pre-empt state law."25 The court found
that the RLA preempted all four of the plaintiffs' state law
claims because they all required an interpretation of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement between the plaintiffs and United.2
In Goulart v. United Airlines, Inc.,27 the plaintiffs were seventy-
one employees or former employees of United Airlines. They
claimed that United and the International Association of Ma-
chinists and Aerospace Workers violated RICO by misrepresent-
ing the seniority consequences of accepting promotions that
occurred from a growth in United's business in the mid-80s.
United allegedly informed them that company seniority, not
classification seniority, would determine their status in the event
of layoffs or recalls. However, when a downturn in United's
business occurred, the classification system was used.
Defendant filed for summary judgment on the basis that the
plaintiffs' claims only stated a minor dispute which the RLA pre-
empted. The court determined that the RLA governed relations
between air carriers and their union employees by establishing a
mechanism for the settlement of two classes of disputes, major
disputes and minor disputes.2 8 The latter "gro[w] out of griev-
ances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements
covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions."2 9 Such dis-
putes "must be resolved only through the RLA mechanisms." °
Thus, the RLA preempted all of these types of claims. An excep-
tion existed, however, for causes of actions independent of the
collective bargaining agreement.
23 See id. at 746.
24 See id. at 746-47.
25 Id. at 748.
26 See id. at 749.
27 No. 94-C237, 1996 WL 111895, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 1996).
28 See id. at *1.
2 Id. at *1-2 (quoting Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 252-53).
30 Id. at *2 (quoting Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 253).
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The defendants claimed that the RICO claim was preempted
by the RLA because the seniority rights that the plaintiffs sought
to vindicate through their RICO claim were based on an existing
collective bargaining agreement. The court decided that be-
cause "the plaintiffs had no substantive right to seniority bene-
fits independent of the collective bargaining agreement[,]"
their RICO claim was preempted. 31 The court concluded,
"[t]he ultimate relief sought by the plaintiffs, the restoration of
their seniority benefits, does not exist independent of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement.... In order to vindicate these rights,
the plaintiffs must rely on the mechanisms established by the
Railway Labor Act."3 2
The plaintiffs in Fry v. Airline Pilots Ass'n International3 were
pilots who crossed a picket line during a 1985 United strike.
When the strike was over, the strike breakers encountered har-
assment from the returning striking workers. Plaintiffs filed suit
against United Airlines and the Airline Pilots Association Inter-
national (APAI) on eleven claims arising out of that harassment.
The district court adopted a magistrate judge's recommenda-
tion that the claims were preempted by the RLA because the
claims required interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements.
The Tenth Circuit first looked at the plaintiffs' claims against
United. The court determined that the emotional distress
claims brought by the plaintiffs were preempted by the RLA be-
cause an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement
between the airline and the union was necessary to resolve the
claim.3 4 Because such interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements was considered a "minor dispute" under the RLA,
the court stated that the sole remedy for such a dispute is arbi-
tration.35 The court then turned to the plaintiffs' federal con-
spiracy RICO and state corrupt organization claims. Again, the
court found that the RLA preempted these claims because they
were classified as "minor disputes" with the remedy for such
claims being arbitration. 6
The court then turned to the plaintiffs' claims against the
APAI. The court found that the RLA did not preempt emo-
S Id. at *4.
32 Id.
s 88 F.3d 831 (10th Cir. 1996).
34 See id. at 840.
35 See id. at 837.
S6 See id.
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tional distress claims brought by the plaintiffs against the union
because an interpretation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment was unnecessary for resolution of the claim. 7 The court
stated, "the alleged conduct here does not need to be explained
in terms of the contract. Obviously, outrageous conduct is 'not
even arguably sanctioned by the labor contract.' 38
The plaintiff in Kozy v. Wings West Airlines, Inc.3 '9 was a pilot
fired by Wings West for sexual harassment. Pursuant to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement between the airline and his union,
plaintiff filed a grievance protesting his dismissal to the System
Board of Adjustment. The Board dismissed his grievance after
which he filed suit against both the airline and his union. Plain-
tiffs action against Wings West was for breach of the collective
bargaining agreement, and the action against the union was for
breach of the duty of fair representation.
Central to the plaintiffs complaint was that after his grievance
hearing, the Board failed to send him a written decision detail-
ing why it had ruled against him, as required by the arbitration
process. The district court granted both of the defendants' mo-
tions for summary judgment. The union's summary judgment
motion was granted based on the statute of limitations having
run, and the airline's motion was granted on the grounds that
the plaintiff's claims were subject to arbitration under the RLA.
The plaintiff then appealed.
The court first looked to whether it had jurisdiction to hear
the cause of action. The court found that the arbitration pro-
cess set up by the RLA had not been satisfied because the Board
had not issued a written decision.4° The federal appeals court
found that the district court did not have jurisdiction to review
the plaintiff's claims against the airline and the union.4 1 The
court remanded the case to the district court for the limited
purpose of issuing an order compelling the Board to issue a
written decision resolving the plaintiff's grievance.42
37 See id. at 841.
38 Id. (citing Keehr v. Consolidated Freightways of Del., Inc., 825 F.2d 133, 138
n.6 (7th Cir. 1987)).
39 89 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 1996).
40 See id. at 639.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 640.
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B. AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT PREEMPTION
The plaintiffs in Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc.43 were two flight
attendants who lost their jobs when their former employer,
Frontier Airlines, went into bankruptcy. When United refused
to hire them as flight attendants, they filed suit, contending that
United's refusal violated the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) 44 and the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA).' 5
United claimed that it rejected the plaintiffs' applications be-
cause they failed to meet the weight requirements for new flight
attendant hires.
The court found that the ADEA provides that "it shall be un-
lawful for an employer . . .to fail or refuse to hire or to dis-
charge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age."46
Plaintiffs maintained in their ADEA argument that the airline
intentionally discriminated against them because of their age.
Plaintiffs also maintained that United's use of an age-neutral
weight requirements for hiring, even if not motivated by dis-
criminatory purposes, disparately impacted them because of
their age.
For a plaintiff to prevail on a disparate treatment claim under
the ADEA, she must show that age actually motivated the em-
ployer's decision not to hire her.47 The court found no direct
evidence of any discriminatory intent.4" Plaintiffs, instead,
pointed to circumstantial evidence. The court found that where
a discrimination claim rests on circumstantial evidence, a plain-
tiff must show: "(1) they were within the protected age group;
(2) they were not hired; (3) they were qualified for the position;
and (4) [that the employer] filled the positions with younger
applicants."49 United claimed that the plaintiffs failed to estab-
lish evidence that they met the third requirement-that they
were qualified for the flight attendant positions because they
did not meet the airline's weight standards for new hires. The
43 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996).
- 29 U.S.C. § 621-34 (1994).
45 49 U.S.C. § 42101-03 (1994).
46 Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1003 n.4 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1) (1994)) (alteration
in original).
47 See id. at 1004.
48 See id.
49 Id. (citing Cooper v. Asplund Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1547 n.1
(10th Cir. 1988)).
19971
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE
court concluded that even if the plaintiffs did establish a prima
facie case, the plaintiffs still lost because they produced no evi-
dence that United selectively applied its weight standards only to
older applicants and hired younger applicants who failed to
meet those standards. 50 Additionally, the court found that the
"[p]laintiffs have not shown that they actually met the weight
guidelines and, thus, must have been rejected for some other
reason."
51
The court then moved to the disparate impact argument.
Plaintiffs claimed, in the alternative to the disparate treatment
claim, that the "hiring decisions violated the ADEA because the
decisions were based on weight requirements that disparately
impacted older job applicants." 52 The court found that dispa-
rate impact claims "challenge 'employment practices that are
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in
fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be
justified by business necessity.'"5 3 The court cleared up the un-
certainty about whether disparate impact claims could be
brought under the ADEA when it stated: " [W]e now ... hold
that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the
ADEA."54 The court, in making this decision, looked to the
plain language of the ADEA itself, the legislative history of the
ADEA, subsequent amendments to the ADEA by Congress,
Supreme Court decisions on the ADEA, and treatment given to
the ADEA by other courts.
Plaintiffs also claimed that United violated the ADA by not
hiring the plaintiffs, as required their by the statute. Under the
ADA, a "protected employee" who loses their job as a result of
deregulation of the airline industry becomes a "designated em-
ployee" and is entitled to a right of first hire by other carriers.55
However, under Department of Labor regulations promulgated
pursuant to the ADA, applicants must meet the applicable pre-
requisites or qualifications determined by the airline for a va-
cancy with the exception of initial hiring age.56 The court
stated, "[a]s a general matter, weight requirements are permissi-
50 See id. at 1006.
51 Id. at 1005.
52 Id. at 1006.
53 Id. (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993)).
54 Id. at 1007.
55 See id. at 1010 (citing the Americans with Disabilities Act, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 42101(a) (3), 42103(a) (1994)).
56 See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 220.20(a), 220.21(a)(1) (1996)).
AVIATION LAW DEVELOPMENTS
ble job-related criteria for flight attendants."5 7 Thus, the court
also dismissed the ADA claim.
The litigation in Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.58 arose
when Delta bought certain Pan Am World Airways assets in
1991. Among those assets were 774 former pilots for Pan Am.
The plaintiffs, 488 of those 774 pilots, brought suit under the
New York State Human Rights laws and the New York City
Human Rights law, alleging discrimination. They alleged viola-
tions of the terms and conditions of their employment based on
their age regarding the methods used by Delta to integrate them
into pilot seniority, medical benefits, and pay increases in rela-
tion to that of existing Delta pilots. Delta filed a motion to dis-
miss claiming that their allegations were preempted by the ADA.
The court identified a two-part test for ADA preemption of state
law claims: "First, the state law claim must involve the enforce-
ment of a state law. Second, the state law must have a connec-
tion with or relation to airline prices, routes, or services."5 9
The court found that the first part of the test was satisfied
because the plaintiffs did not dispute that the action seeks to
enforce a state statute.6 0 The court stated that the real issue was
whether the state human rights law and the city human rights
law related to prices or services as identified in the ADA. 6 1 Delta
argued that any changes it would have to make to its retirement
plans in accommodating the plaintiffs' claims would have a large
economic impact on its fares. The plaintiffs argued, however,
that if such an impact occurred, it would be too insignificant to
warrant preemption. The court concluded that the ADA pre-
empted the plaintiffs' claims because "the order of a pilot sen-
iority list has a connection with and therefore is 'related to' the
provision of air carrier services .... Indeed, pilot staffing is an
integral element of the 'transportation itself."' 62
C. DUE PROCESS
The matter of Clarny v. United States was brought by former
air traffic controllers fired by President Reagan after they partic-
ipated in a 1981 strike. The litigation ensued after the govern-
57 Id.
58 927 F. Supp. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
59 Id. at 111.
60 See id.
61 See id.
62 Id. at 112.
63 85 F.3d 1041 (2d Cir. 1996).
1997]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ment's allegedly abusive treatment of the air traffic controllers.
After the strike was over, the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM), pursuant to directions from President Reagan, said that
it was barring strikers from working for the federal government
for three years and further said that it was barring the air traffic
controllers from working with private companies under contract
with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Plaintiffs filed
suit claiming that the latter policy violated their right to due
process and equal protection. Additionally, the plaintiffs
claimed that the OPM directive barring them from working with
the FAA deprived them of a protective property interest without
due process. The court dismissed the former stating, "Congress
made it clear that any person who participates in a strike against
the federal government has no right to federal employment."64
Further, the court stated that it agreed with the OPM that Presi-
dent Reagan had intended to bar the strikers from working in-
definitely for the FAA.65 Lastly, the court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that they possessed a Fifth Amendment property in-
terest and the right to employment with the FAA. 66
The plaintiffs also claimed that the OPM's prohibition on the
plaintiffs' working again for the FAA violated the OPM's regula-
tions regarding such matters. The court disagreed, stating, "the
President, acting under his statutory authority to regulate fed-
eral employment, may issue a directive overriding that
regulation."67
Plaintiffs further claimed that the OPM violated the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act's requirements of notice and comment
rulemaking procedures. The court disagreed with this, stating
that what the OPM had done was interpret a rule rather than
create a legislative rule. 68 Thus, it made interpretive rule ex-
empt from the Administrative Procedure Act's rulemaking
procedures.69
The court then stated that the plaintiffs did not have standing
to pursue their claim regarding the prohibition against employ-
ment with private entities under contract with the FAA.70 The
court found that they lacked standing because the FAA policy
64 Id. at 1046.
65 See id.
6 See id.
67 Id. at 1047 (citation omitted).
6 See id. at 1048.




had been repealed and because the plaintiffs had not shown any
injury by enforcement of the policy.71
The plaintiff in Linney v. Turpen72 was a former airport police
officer suspended after an investigation involving a lost bracelet
raised suspicions regarding his involvement in the matter. The
plaintiff was suspended after a dismissal hearing during which
there was an inquiry to uncover statements the plaintiff made
during the investigation. Although the plaintiff admitted that
he was lying during the investigation, he maintained that the
method in which his dismissal hearing officer was selected de-
prived him of due process. The court found no merit in the
plaintiff's claim and supported its ruling on four grounds. 73
First, the plaintiff did not use the proper procedure to protest
the selection of the hearing officer.74 Therefore, he was pre-
cluded from challenging this process on appeal. Second, the
plaintiff was given notice of the proposed action, the grounds
for doing so, the charges and materials upon which the action
was based, and the opportunity to respond in opposition to the
action.75 Third, the hearing officer was a reasonably impartial
and uninvolved reviewer of the charges before the plaintiff.76
Fourth, the plaintiff never showed any actual bias on the part of
the hearing officer.77 The court, thus, affirmed the original
holding. 78
D. LABOR LAWS
The plaintiff in Rodriguez v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana79
sought overtime pay for work he had done during overtime
hours, mealtime, and the Puerto Rican day of rest as an em-
ployee of Iberian Airlines. He sought this overtime on the basis
of the Puerto Rican labor laws.80 However, Iberian claimed that
because the plaintiff was both an administrator and executive of
the airline, he was exempt from the labor laws. The court ap-
plied two tests to determine his status. To satisfy the administra-
71 See id.
72 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
73 See id. at 817.
74 See id.
75 See id.
76 See id. at 818.
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 923 F. Supp. 304 (D.P.R. 1996).
80 See P.R. Laws Ann. 29 §§ 295 (1985 & 1991 Supp.).
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tor test, the defendant must show that "(1) [the] plaintiff
performed office or non-manual work directly related to (a)
management policies, (b) Iberia's general business operations,
or (c) Iberia's customers; and (2) [p]laintiff customarily and
regularly exercised discretion and independent judgment.","
Whereas, to satisfy the executive test, the defendant must show
that: "(1) [the] [p]laintiff's primary duty consisted of managing
Iberia's enterprise or a customarily recognized department or
subdivision of Iberia; and (2) [the] [p]laintiff customarily and
regularly directed the work of two or more employees of the
enterprise, department, or subdivision. "82
The court analyzed the plaintiffs job duties and functions
and found that his employment was an integral part of the direc-
tion and function of Iberian's operations at the airport.8 3 The
court found that the plaintiff was given a lot of discretion by the
airline to make decisions critical to the degree of success Iberian
experienced at the airport. The court concluded that because
of the plaintiffs status in Iberia's operations at the airport and
his direction of the operations there, he was an administrator
and an executive and, thus, exempt from the Act's overtime
provisions.84
E. FAMILY AND MEDICAL LviE ACT OF 1993
The plaintiff in Rich v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.85 filed suit alleging
that Delta suspended and fired her in violation of the Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) .86 Delta hired the plain-
tiff as a flight attendant in June 1987. For each flight on which
she worked, she was required to sign in between sixty and ninty
minutes prior to the departure time for the flight. When the
plane stopped at the gate at the conclusion of the flight, the
time was referred to as a "block-in time." After the block-in
time, plaintiff would perform duties such as saying "good bye" to
the passengers and engage in debriefing sessions with the flight
crew. The plaintiff claimed that such duties took approximately
twenty to thirty minutes. After the deplaning duties, the plain-
tiff would either wait at the airport to work another flight or be
released from duty. Her duty hours were comprised of the
81 Rodriquez, 923 F. Supp. at 311 (citation omitted).
82 Id. at 312 (citation omitted).
8- See id. at 314.
84 See id.
85 921 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
86 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (1994).
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hours between her sign-in through the block-in time. The time
spent on deplaning duties was not calculated in her duty hours.
From August 1993 until April 1994, the plaintiff missed many
days from work because of a chronic respiratory tract infection,
inflammation of the gums, pelvic endometriosis, and dysplasia
of the cervix. The plaintiff contended that such time off was
covered by the FMLA. However, on April 23, 1994, Delta sus-
pended the plaintiff without pay for excessive absenteeism and
for allegedly falsifying a doctor's certificate to explain one of her
absences. Delta later fired her on May 20, 1994, for the same
reasons. The plaintiff filed suit and claimed she should have
qualified under the FMLA. After she filed suit, Delta filed a mo-
tion for summary judgment alleging that she was not an "eligible
employee" under the FMLA and, thus, not entitled to its
benefits.
The court analyzed the FMLA and found that an employer
must allow an eligible employee to take off up to twelve work
weeks of time during any twelve-month period for serious health
problems.8 7 The court determined that "[a] n eligible employee
is one who has worked for a covered employer for at least twelve
months, has worked at least 1,250 hours during the previous
twelve months, and has been employed at a worksite where
there are at least fifty or more employees within a seventy-five
mile radius."88 Delta alleged that the plaintiff had not worked
the requisite hours to qualify for protection under the FMLA.
The court stated that the FMLA directs courts to calculate the
hours of service according to the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA). 89 The United States Supreme Court clarified the
FLSA's definition of working time in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.90 as
time spent "predominantly for the employer's benefit or for the
employee's."91 The federal district court interpreted this as
meaning "hours spent by an employee engaged in her principal
work activities are considered to be hours worked under the
FLSA." 92
The court found that because Delta had not maintained
records of the time the plaintiff spent during deplaning activi-
ties, the plaintiff is presumed to have worked the necessary 1250
87 See Rich, 921 F. Supp. at 772 (citations omitted).
8 Id.
89 See id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(C) (1994)).
90 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
91 Id. at 137.
92 Rich, 921 F. Supp. at 772 (citations omitted).
1997]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
hours. "To overcome this presumption, the defendant must
clearly demonstrate that the employee did not work 1,250 hours
during the previous twelve months."9 3 In determining the cor-
rect amount of time to be attributable to plaintiff, the court
found the time the plaintiff spent on layovers should not be in-
cluded in that calculation.94 Without the layover time included,
the court determined that the twenty to thirty minutes de-
planing time, when calculated with her regular duty hours, still
did not add up to the 1250 hours of service necessary for FLMA
coverage. Therefore, the court granted Delta's motion for sum-
mary judgment.95
F. RAcIAL DISCRIMINATION
The plaintiff in Landon v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.96 was a black
male employed at Northwest. After the plaintiff was involved in
a conveyor belt incident, he was required to undergo a drug
test. The results were positive for marijuana and the plaintiff
was fired. The plaintiff brought suit against Northwest alleging
four causes of action: (1) that he was fired for racially motivated
purposes; (2) that Northwest's refusal to rehire him was in retali-
ation for his legal actions against the airline; (3) that the drug
testing was an invasion of his privacy; and (4) defamation.
Northwest moved for summary judgment.
The court addressed plaintiff's allegation that he was fired for
racially motivated purposes by stating that: (1) he was part of a
protected class; (2) he was qualified for the job position; (3)
there was adverse action taken against him; and (4) the evi-
dence allowed an inference of improper motivation on behalf of
Northwest. 97 The court found that all four prongs were satis-
fied. 98 The burden then shifted to Northwest to show a legiti-
mate business reason for their dismissal of the plaintiff. The
court found that Northwest had reasonable suspicion of drug
use by the plaintiff because of the results of the drug test.99 The
burden then shifted to the plaintiff to show that the defendant's
reason was (a) a pretext and (b) unlawful discrimination. The
court concluded that there was insufficient evidence presented
93 Id. at 773 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(c)).
94 See id. at 777.
95 See id. at 778.
96 72 F.3d 620 (8th Cir. 1995).




by the plaintiff to show that there was the pretext to
discriminate. 100
The court then addressed plaintiff's claim that Northwest re-
fused to rehire the plaintiff in retaliation for his bringing legal
action against the airline. The court found that the evidence
did not show that he was not rehired for retaliatory purposes,
but rather, because he failed to meet the conditions Northwest
had set to rehire. The court ruled in favor of Northwest on both
points. 10 1
The court upheld summary judgment against the plaintiff on
his remaining two claims, finding that public safety considera-
tions were sufficient countervailing interests to justify drug test-
ing, and that the truth of the statement regarding the drug
test was an absolute defense to the plaintiffs claim for
defamation. 102
As reported on the front page of the Wall Street Journa, Cap-
tain Wayne 0. Witter, or Captain WOW as he liked to be called,
was a Delta Air Lines pilot for over twenty years. 10 3 Currently,
his status is very uncertain. Captain Witter has been described
as "stubborn, pompous, self-centered, domineering, belligerent,
and aggressively intimidating," but he is also respected for his
piloting abilities. In fact, his second wife, whom he stuck in the
face with a fork, said that if she was in an airline emergency, she
would want Captain Witter in the pilot's seat because of his take
charge personality. It is that personality that has Captain Witter,
Delta Air Lines, and a physician to whom Delta referred Captain
Witter embroiled in litigation as to whether he should be perma-
nently removed from the skies.
Captain Witter's first twenty years with Delta, coming after a
tour of duty in Vietnam, were nearly spotless. However, in July
of 1981, he was reprimanded for drinking a vodka and
grapefruit juice drink sixteen hours before he was to fly. Six
years later he was suspended for six weeks when he said over a
loudspeaker to a full plane, "I've already got your money, so
shut the f- up. "104 Unfortunately for Captain Witter, an FAA
inspector was on board at the time. Although he claimed the
broadcast was unintentional, he was still suspended.
1oo See id. at 624-25.
101 See id. at 625-26.
102 See id. at 627-28.
103 See Martha Brannigan, Captain WOW. Wien is Mental State of a Pilot Grounds
for Grounding Him?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 1996, at Al.
104 Id.
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After those relatively minor violations, he began to have medi-
cal problems in the late 1980s. In 1988, he was diagnosed with
sleep apnea (interrupted breathing), a condition which, if un-
treated, can cause daytime drowsiness. He was grounded while
this problem was evaluated and treated. Things went fairly
smoothly for Captain Witter for the next year and a half. Then
in February of 1992, after having an argument with his wife, he
went to his bedroom where he kept his gun and said, "I'm going
to end it for both of us."0 5 He was put in psychiatric hospitals
for a month, at which time he was first diagnosed as having per-
sonality disorder. One doctor concluded that "he is at a rather
high risk of engaging in some type of impulsive or emotional
outburst which could have some disastrous consequences. " 16
Three months later, his attending physician said that Captain
Witter was ready to go back to work for Delta. In early 1993, the
FAA recertified him. Delta, however, sent him to Dr. Berry,
known to pilots as the "dreaded Dr. Berry"10 7 because of his
tough reputation for grounding pilots. Dr. Berry, however, also
pronounced the captain ready to fly. Upon returning to the
skies, the captain flew smoothly. However, four months into his
return, problems resurfaced. On an assignment in Europe, he
and two other crew members clashed repeatedly, with the con-
flict reaching a zenith at the gate in Frankfurt, Germany, where
the second officer reported to superiors that the captain had "a
screaming fit in the cockpit."10 8 He added, "Captain Witter's
terribly bitter attitude along with his violent and aggressive per-
sonality make it extremely difficult for the other crew members
to perform their duties ... I am extremely concerned that all
these character traits combined will some day result in disaster
and great loss of life."109 Captain Witter, on the other hand,
stated that he had simply been giving the flight engineer "a
Marine Corps butt chewing. " 11°
Delta again became suspicious of Captain Witter's possible
unsafe personality and assigned monitors to fly with him, all of
whom stated that his behavior was fine. Delta then sent him
back to Dr. Berry. The doctor found the captain to be "'hypo-








passages and winking at him, but that the verses had no rele-
vance."" ' Dr. Berry concluded that the captain had a "narcissis-
tic personalty disorder,"" 2 a psychiatric condition that is
sufficient to disqualify airline pilots under FAA rules. Finally, on
March 5, 1994, Captain Witter was suspended. He has been
placed on medical disability at half-pay ever since.
Captain Witter then filed suit against Delta and Dr. Berry. He
sought reinstatement as a senior captain, which pays about
$180,000 a year, in addition to damages. He says the four-year
ordeal has been more financially and mentally stressful to him
than all of his time in Vietnam. Delta claimed that they cannot
take chances when it comes to safety.1 3
On December 1, 1995, a National Transportation Safety
Board judge ordered the FAA to reissue Captain Witter's medi-
cal certificate. 1 4 The judge found that the problems with his
wife and the crew incident in Frankfurt were not sufficient signs
of mental disorder. He said that the cockpit clash was "the first
and only incident of this sort in [his] otherwise exemplary flying
record," 15 and that he believed that all three crew members




The case of Cappello v. Duncan Aircraft Sales of Florida, Inc.'17
involved an aircraft that made a night-time departure from a
San Diego airport and subsequently crashed into a mountain
two or three minutes into the flight. The question for the court
to decide was whether the air traffic controllers with whom the
pilot had been in contact before and during this ill-fated flight
were negligent in not warning the pilot of mountains along his
flight path. 8
The court found that the key factors in this case were that the







17 79 F.3d 1465 (6th Cir. 1996).
118 See id. at 1467.
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rounding terrain." 9 Because he was flying under visual flight
rules, he was not required to stay in contact with the air traffic
controllers nor were they required to stay in contact with him.
In analyzing the instrument flight rules-visual flight rules rela-
tionship between the pilot and the air traffic controller, the
court observed, "There are detailed sets of assumptions, customs
and patterns of conduct shared by pilots and FAA flight assist-
ants, and in the end, the comparative negligence problem in
this case is about whether the FAA employees failed to comply
properly with this set of shared assumptions and
expectations. "120
By taking off pursuant to visual flight rules, the court thought
that the pilot had assumed the responsibility for being aware of
the surrounding terrain and the circumstances in which he was
flying. The court quoted another court in a similar case, Biles v.
United States:' 21 "[C] ontrollers must be able to assume that pilots
are complying with FAA regulations and understand their cir-
cumstances in the absence of a pilot request or other notice to
the contrary."1 22
The court looked specifically at the communications between
the pilot and the flight specialist. Since the pilot said he did not
have the required charts showing the recommended departure
routes, the flight specialist then read the departure plate to the
pilot word for word. In analyzing their interaction, the court
determined that the flight specialist had done the most with
what little information he had been given by the pilot. "There is
no basis whatever [sic] for a finding that [the flight specialist's]
conduct was negligent or a valid proximate cause of the pilot's
mistakes."1 23
The court then turned to the interaction between the pilot
and the departure controller with whom the pilot came in con-
tact after he had taken off. The court again felt that the depar-
ture controller had merely done his job and was unable to do
what the plaintiff claimed he should have been doing for the
pilot in providing collision avoidance systems. The entire time
the pilot was in contact with the departure controller, he had
not squawked an identification code, nor been placed on the
departure controller's radar screen, so that technically he was
119 See id. at 1468.
120 Id. at 1468.
121 848 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1988).
122 Cappello, 79 F.3d at 1469.
12a Id. at 1472.
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not under the control of the departure controller. Because of
this fact, the departure controller could not possibly have been
negligent, as he had no responsibilities to an aircraft over which
he had no control. 124
The decedents in Cohen v. Lowe Aviation Co. 125 died when their
Cessna 172 crashed while they attempted take off. The dece-
dents' estate sued the defendant in a wrongful death action, al-
leging that Lowe Aviation negligently failed to maintain the
plane and that an employee of Lowe Aviation was negligent in
failing to provide adequate flight supervision. The decedents'
estate appealed a jury verdict for the defendant.
The plaintiffs' first issue on appeal was that the trial court
erred in disallowing them to introduce evidence showing that
the plane's seat was defective. The seat slipped backwards dur-
ing take off and caused a stall, which caused the crash. The
Georgia appellate court found that all the evidence had been
adequately presented and that the jury had sufficient evidence
on which to base its verdict. The plaintiffs also maintained that
the trial court allowed bias and prejudice to taint the jury ver-
dict. More specifically, they alleged that there were impermissi-
ble references to the decedents' Jewish religion and economic
status which supposedly biased the jury against him. The court
found that because no objections had been made during the
jury trial, the court had nothing to review as the issues were not
preserved for appellate review.1 26
The defendant in Egan v. Omniflight Helicopters, Inc.127 was a
provider of helicopter transportation. Co-defendant Southern
Tier Air Rescue (STAR) was a provider of emergency medical
services and patient care. To supplement its existing emergency
medical services, STAR entered into an agreement with Omnif-
light Helicopters (Omniflight) whereby Omniflight would pro-
vide helicopter transportation for STAR's personnel and
patients. The decedent was a helicopter pilot employed by
Omniflight who was killed while flying a contract flight for
STAR.
The plaintiff, the administrator of the decedent's estate,
brought a negligence action against Omniflight and STAR alleg-
ing that STAR had been negligent in allowing the decedent to
124 See id. at 1474.
125 470 S.E.2d 813 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
126 See id. at 815.
127 639 N.Y.S.2d 77 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
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pilot the helicopter when STAR knew or should have known
that the decedent lacked the necessary piloting skills. STAR
moved for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint as it ap-
plied to STAR. The lower court denied STAR's motion.
On appeal, the court stated that "'elemental to any recovery
in negligence' is that the tortfeasor owe a duty of reasonable
care to an injured party. '1 28 Because of this, the court observed
that such a duty requires "an examination of an injured person's
reasonable expectation of the care owed and the basis for the
expectation and the legal imposition of a duty." 1 9 The court
determined that it would have been unreasonable for the dece-
dent to expect STAR to owe him a duty to essentially protect
him from himself.1 30 The court also found no evidence of such
a duty in the contract between STAR and Omniflight.13 1
The court also stated that STAR was not responsible for any
negligence on the part of Omniflight because of Omniflight's
status as an independent contractor. The court stated that an
employer such as STAR is not liable for the acts of the in-
dependent contractors it hires. 132
The decedent in Blome v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp.131 was a
coast guard inspector killed when the helicopter in which he
was riding crashed in the Gulf of Mexico. The decedent's estate
filed suit for recovery under Texas's wrongful death statute.
The defendant, the manufacturer of the helicopter, moved for
summary judgment, alleging that the claim was governed by the
Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 34 which has been held
to prohibit punitive and non-pecuniary damages.
The court stated that DOHSA was applicable when deaths oc-
cur "beyond a marine league [three nautical miles] from the
shore of any State." 135 The evidence showed that the crash oc-
curred seven to eleven miles from the coast of Texas. The plain-
tiff maintained, however, that the territorial boundary of Texas
is three marine leagues offshore and the court agreed.1 3 6 Thus,
a question of fact remained as to whether the accident occurred
128 Id. at 78 (citations omitted).




133 924 F. Supp. 805 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
134 46 U.S.C. App. §§ 761-67 (1994).
'35 Blome, 924 F. Supp. at 808 (quoting 46 U.S.C. App. § 761).
136 See id. at 814.
AVIATION LAW DEVELOPMENTS
within the state boundary, rendering summary judgment
inappropriate.
B. AIR CARRIER NEGLIGENCE
The plaintiff in Travel All Over The World, Inc. v. Saudi Arabia13 7
was a travel agency which made travel arrangements for people
wishing to make the journey to the Hajj religious event. Travel
All Over The World's (TAOW) travel arrangements provided
that the passengers were to fly to New York where they would
connect with a Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAA) flight. However,
the flight to New York was delayed by weather, which resulted in
many passengers missing the SAA flight. When the passengers
attempted to rebook the flight, SAA required them to repur-
chase the tickets through SAA rather than TAOW, thus causing
TAOW to lose its commission on the ticket sales. TAOW then
filed suit alleging that SAA made false representations about the
plaintiff to the rebooking passengers. SAA allegedly told
TAOW's clients that TAOW was not a reputable company, that
TAOW had not booked all the seats it claimed it had, and that
TAOW was known for lying to its clients. TAOW's suit alleged
seven counts: (1) breach of contract; (2) tortious interference
with a business relationship; (3) defamation; (4) slander; (5)
fraud; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (7)
'additional tortious interference with a business relationship af-
ter the litigation ensued. SAA maintained that all of TAOW's
claims were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA).
The lower court accepted this argument and dismissed TAOW's
complaint.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied the United
States Supreme Court's decisions in Morales v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc.138 and American Airlines v. Wolens,1 3 9 in which the scope
of ADA preemption was more precisely drawn.1 40 After analyz-
ing the Morales and Wolens decisions, the Seventh Circuit identi-
fied "two distinct requirements for a law to be expressly
preempted by the ADA: (1) A state must 'enact or enforce' a law
that (2) 'relates to' airline rates, routes, or services, either by
137 73 F.3d 1423 (7th Cir. 1996).
138 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
139 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
140 See Trave4 73 F.3d at 1430.
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expressly referring to them or by having a significant economic
affect upon them." 14
1
With that preemption standard, the court turned to the
breach of contract count. The court followed Wolens and stated
that the count was not preempted: "[T]he plaintiffs here are
not alleging a violation of state-imposed obligations, but rather
are contending that the airline breached a self-imposed under-
taking."142 Thus, the court held that the breach of contract
count was not preempted by the ADA.
The court next turned to the slander and defamation counts.
The court looked again to Morales and Wolens and held that for
an ADA preemption to occur, a tort claim must refer to or have
a connection with airline rates, routes, or services. Here, the
court concluded that SAA's statements were not part of any con-
tractual relationship between SAA and TAOW, nor did they ex-
pressly refer to airline rates, routes, or services. Thus, the court
held that the defamation and slander counts were not
preempted.1 43
The court then looked at the other intentional tort counts.
The court determined that those counts referred to airline
"services"-the ticketing and transportation provided by the air-
line itself 144 The court looked to the underlying nature of the
actions taken rather than the manner in which they were accom-
plished to determine if such actions were related to airline serv-
ices for the purposes of ADA preemption. The court concluded
that the counts were preempted to the extent that SAA's actions
related to SAA's refusal to transport passengers who had booked
travel with TAOW because they related to SAA services.14
The cause of action in Capacchione v. Qantas Airways, Ltd."4
arose when the plaintiffs flew from Los Angeles to Sydney, Aus-
tralia, on Qantas Airlines. Pursuant to Australian regulations,
Qantas was required to spray the interior of the aircraft with an
insecticide called Permethrin to prevent alien insects from in-
fecting Australia. All Qantas flights were treated with the insecti-
cide. The plaintiff sued for injuries that she allegedly suffered
as a result of exposure to Permethrin on both legs of the flight.
On the original flight from Los Angeles to Sydney, plaintiff did
141 Id. at 1432.
142 Id.
143 See id. at 1433.
14 See id. at 1434.
145 See id.
146 25 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 17,346 (C.D. Ca. 1996).
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not ask, and Qantas did not tell her anything, about an insecti-
cide treatment. During and after the plaintiff's flight, she exper-
ienced itchiness and dizziness, and upon her arrival she had
symptoms of fatigue, nausea and a metallic taste in her mouth.
Before returning to Los Angeles, plaintiff contacted Qantas cus-
tomer service representatives to inquire whether the insecticide
would be sprayed on the aircraft of her next flight. She was as-
sured that the plane would not be sprayed. However, on her
return flight, the plaintiff experienced the same symptoms as
before and then discovered that the plane had been sprayed.
The court first addressed the plaintiff's claim of negligent ex-
posure to pesticide. The court determined that the plaintiffs
ticket tariff applied because it provided, in part, that the
"[c]arrier is not liable for any damage directly and solely arising
out of its compliance with . . .government [laws and] regula-
tions. . . ."I47 The court pointed out that Australian regulations
require the application of the pesticide to the airplane. 4
Although plaintiff could still recover if she could show that the
Warsaw Convention barred such provisions of the tariff, the
court determined that there is no claim under the Convention
because the incident was not an "accident" as defined in the
Convention.'49 Therefore, the tariff provisions applied, and the
plaintiff was denied recovery.1 50
The plaintiff next claimed negligent failure to warn of the risk
of exposure to the insecticide. After it decided that the Warsaw
Convention and the ADA could not preempt the plaintiff's
cause of action for duty to warn, the court decided that the
plaintiff's claim failed because plaintiff failed to show that
Qantas's failure to warn was unreasonably dangerous to the
plaintiff. 15 1 The court then dismissed the plaintiff's contract
claim but allowed litigation on her misrepresentation claim to
go forward. 5 2 The court stated, " [G]iven the high standard of
care owed by a common carrier like Qantas to its passengers,
there is an argument that the Qantas supervisor was at least neg-
ligent in not telling Cappachione that the cabin had been
treated with Permethrin ....
147 Id. 17,348.
148 See id.
149 See id. 17,349.
1,0,o See id.
151 See id. 17,351.
152 See id. 17,354.
153 Id.
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The litigation in Stanford v. Kuwait Airways Corp.15 arose when
terrorists hijacked Kuwait Airways Flight KU221 bound for Kara-
chi, Pakistan, and diverted it to Tehran, Iran. During the course
of the hijacking, the terrorists killed two Americans and tor-
tured two others. The estates of the two deceased Americans
and one of the survivors brought a negligence suit against Mid-
dle Eastern Airlines (MEA) alleging that the airline's negligence
was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries. The plaintiffs
appealed from the district court's decision granting MEA judg-
ment as a matter of law on the ground that MEA's actions were
not the proximate cause of the injuries that occurred because of
the hijacking. In their appeal, the plaintiffs argued:
(1) MEA had a duty to use due care to avoid the risk of hijacking
within [an airline] interline system; (2) there was sufficient evi-
dence for a jury to conclude that the failure of MEA to use due
care was a proximate cause of the injuries; and (3) the foresee-
able negligence of (a) the security officials at Dubai and (b) Ku-
wait Airways were not intervening acts breaking the causal link
between MEA and the injuries and deaths.155
After the court decided that it would apply regular concepts
of common law regarding liability to adjudicate the matter, it
attempted to answer the question of "[whether] the circum-
stances in this case create a duty on the part of MEA to protect
[the plaintiffs.]" 156 To decide whether a duty existed, the court
looked to (1) the relationship among the parties; and (2) the
reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured. 157 The
court first examined the relationship among MEA and the vic-
tims. The court stated that "[p]laintiffs demonstrated that MEA
joined an enterprise with interline airlines, including Kuwait
Airways, to facilitate travel among the cooperating carriers.
MEA's participation in interline arrangements with other IATA
airlines was a lucrative venture. ' 15 The court found that MEA
knew or should have known of the warning issued by the Secur-
ity Advisory Committee of IATA of the possibility that terrorists
would board airlines at airports with low security measures and
transfer to other airlines at airports with tighter security.'59 The
court concluded that "a jury could reasonably find that when
154 89 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1996).
155 Id. at 122.
156 Id. at 123.
157 See id. at 123-25.
158 Id. at 124.
159 See id.
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MEA accepted interline passengers aboard its planes in Beirut, it
knew or should have known that there was a danger that ter-
rorists would try to board their airline only to transfer later to a
vulnerable, interline target airplane."1 60
The court then looked to the reasonable foreseeability of
harm to the persons injured. The court identified evidence that
MEA knew of threatened attacks by terrorists, that the practice
of terrorists boarding flights in unsafe airports and transferring
to other airlines was taking place, that the Beirut Airport had
very little security, and that the hijackers' behavior should have
been viewed with suspicion.' 61 Thus, "[a] jury could reasonably
find.., that if MEA did nothing, it would create a zone of risk
that stretched at least as far as the innocent passengers aboard
flights with which the four hijackers would eventually con-
nect."162 The court concluded that
MEA, as a first leg interline carrier, had a duty to protect passen-
gers on other interline connecting flights from unreasonable risk
of harm through the use of reasonable precautions in the face of
reasonably foreseeable risks. MEA was faced with a set of circum-
stances that a jury could reasonably find created a foreseeable
risk, necessitating some action to protect others from an unrea-
sonable threat of hijacking.16 3
The court turned to the lower court's holding that the plain-
tiffs had failed to prove that MEA's inaction was the proximate
cause of the deaths and injuries. The court of appeals dis-
agreed, finding that there was sufficient evidence so that fair
minded jurors could arrive at a verdict against MEA.164 The
plaintiffs presented evidence showing that the hijackers were
able to board the Kuwait Airways jet through unguarded rear
stairs and that the practice in the Middle East of allowing one
passenger to check-in for others was common. Thus, the court
concluded that a reasonable juror could have found that MEA's
behavior could have been the proximate cause of the deaths
and injuries of the Americans onboard the hijacked flight.1 65
The court in Danese v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.166 denied defendant
Delta's motion for summary judgment because a material issue
160 Id.
161 See id. at 125.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 See id. at 126.
165 See id. at 127.
166 No. 95 Civ. 5462 (SHS), 1996 WL 67869 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 1996).
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of fact remained in dispute.1 67 The cause of action arose when
the plaintiff, upon disembarking at Boston's Logan Airport,
slipped on a patch of ice and fractured her ankle while walking
from the plane to the terminal building.
The court applied New York choice of law principles and
found that Massachusetts law applied because it was the situs of
the alleged tort. Under Massachusetts law, "[a] landowner owes
a single duty of reasonable care to all persons lawfully on his
premises." 68 Generally, this duty of care is not breached when a
landowner "provides a reasonably safe 'route of access' to its
premises. "169
Delta, in its motion for summary judgment, claimed that it
did not breach its duty of care. The plaintiff maintained that
she saw the ice before she stepped on it, and that the ice patch
covered the entire width of the walkway. She claimed she chose
not to walk outside the marked walkway because she thought it
might be more dangerous to do so. Plaintiff also presented an
internal Delta memorandum which instructed employees to
make sure passengers remained within the marked walkway.
The court determined that a pure issue of fact remained as to
whether a safe alternative route was available to avoid the ice
patch, and, as a result, denied the motion for summary
judgment. 170
The plaintiff in Freedman v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 71 was travel-
ing from Tampa, Florida, to Albany, New York, on Northwest.
Due to flight delays, however, plaintiff was stranded in Detroit,
Michigan, for ten hours. Plaintiff brought an action for com-
pensatory and punitive damages resulting from the delay. De-
fendant moved to dismiss on the basis that the tariffs printed on
the plaintiffs ticket provided that in the event of such an occur-
rence, the sole and exclusive remedies available to the plaintiff
were alternative transportation or a ticket refund ticket for the
unused portion.
The court stated that the sole issue was whether the exculpa-
tory clause in the contract was valid. The court stated that "l[t] he
tariff constitutes the incorporated terms of the contract between
passenger and airline, and 'if valid, conclusively and exclusively
167 See id. at *1.
168 Id. (quoting Goldman v. United States, 790 F.2d 181, 183 (1st Cir. 1986)).
16 Id. (citations omitted).
170 See id. at *2.
171 638 N.Y.S.2d 906 (N.Y. Albany City Ct. 1996).
AVIATION LAW DEVELOPMENTS
governs the rights and liabilities between the parties.' 172 The
court nonetheless determined that validity of the tariff is over-
ridden by federal common law, which states that a common car-
rier cannot completely exculpate itself from liability. The court
concluded that the terms of the tariff did not preclude the
plaintiff from maintaining an action for breach of contract and
negligence.1 7
The plaintiff in Martinez v. American Airlines, Inc., 74 traveled
from Florida to Puerto Rico on American Airlines. While in Pu-
erto Rico, he became ill and requested immediate transporta-
tion back to Florida for emergency medical treatment.
American was not able to provide a seat for the plaintiff until
five days later. Unfortunately, by that time, gangrene had set
into his leg, which had to be amputated below the knee.
The plaintiff brought a cause of action against American al-
leging that "the defendant's duty to the plaintiff was not limited
to times when the plaintiff was on board the airplane, but in-
stead extended 'throughout the journey continuing until [the
plaintiff] safely arrived at his final destination, his home in Flor-
ida.' 175 Thus, the plaintiff argued that duty required American
to return the plaintiff to Florida when he fell ill and that Ameri-
can had a duty to do this without the plaintiff paying additional
fares.
The Eleventh Circuit disregarded the plaintiffs argument
that the airline had a continuing duty to reasonably and faith-
fully return him to Florida when he felt ill, because the airline
was "engaged for point-to-point transportation, and did not have
a continuing contractual or common law duty to the plaintiff for
the period after the plaintiff's arrival in Puerto Rico and before
his scheduled return . . ,.76 The court affirmed the lower
court's motion to dismiss.1 77
The plaintiff in Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp.'78
was assured by Federal Express that its economy two-day service
was cheaper than its standard overnight service. However, the
plaintiff claimed that the standard service was cheaper and that
172 Id. at 907 (quoting Gluckman v. American Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151,
160 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citations omitted)).
173 See id. at 907-08.
174 74 F.3d 247 (1lth Cir. 1996).
175 Id. at 248 (brackets in original).
176 Id.
177 See id.
178 89 F.3d 1244 (6th Cir. 1996).
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the plaintiff paid a higher price for slower delivery, thus consti-
tuting fraud and misrepresentation. The district court granted
Federal Express's 12(b) (1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
The court of appeals first decided whether the dismissal
under Rule 12(b) (1) was proper. The plaintiff claimed that a
federal court always has jurisdiction to decide if a claim exists
under federal common law. The court stated that the plaintiff
must show "only that the complaint alleges a claim under fed-
eral law, and that the claim is 'substantial.'" 179 The court con-
cluded that although the plaintiff's argument was novel, it was
not frivolous, and the dismissal by the lower court was in
error.
1 80
The court then stated that "[t]he only dispute is whether a
shipper that alleges it was injured by the fraud and deceptive
advertising of an air carrier states a claim under federal com-
mon law." 81 In addition, the court found that there was a lack
of any federal statute, constitutional basis, or federal common
law for a fraud claim against an air carrier. 82 After examining
the legislative purpose behind the ADA, the court concluded
that the action was preempted: "State law fraud claims are pre-
empted because Congress intended [the Department of Trans-
portation] to be the sole legal control on possible advertising
fraud by air carriers, and a federal common law fraud claim is
inappropriate for the same reason. " 183
C. PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS
The case of Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer s4 arose out of two
cases consolidated by the court to consider the extent to which
the ADA preempts state common-law personal injury negligence
actions brought against airlines. The ADA provides that "a State
... may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provi-
sion having the force and effect of law related to a price, route,
or service of an air carrier."1 85
In the first case, the plaintiff was injured when a flight attend-
ant opened an overhead storage bin and a briefcase fell from it,
179 Id. at 1248.
180 See id.
181 Id. at 1249.
182 See id. at 1249-50.
183 Id. at 1251.
184 920 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. 1996).
185 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1994).
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striking the plaintiff on the head. Plaintiff and her husband
sued Continental Airlines for negligence. The airline moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that the action was pre-
empted by the ADA, which the lower court granted. The court
of appeals reversed and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
In the second case, plaintiffs parents had purchased a $25
"meet and assist service" for the plaintiff as a part of his airline
ticket, because of his mental illness. However, when the plaintiff
arrived at the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, no one
was there to meet or greet him, and he ended up in the parking
lot where he was later arrested after an altercation with airport
police. Plaintiff and his parents sued American Eagle Travel
Service for negligence, breach of contract, and violations of the
Texas State Consumer Protection Act. Continental and Ameri-
can moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the ADA
preempted the plaintiffs claims, which a district court granted.
The court of appeals reversed as to the breach of contract and
negligence claims against the airlines. The airlines in both cases
appealed to the Texas Supreme Court, where the court consoli-
dated the two cases.
The Texas Supreme Court began its analysis by reviewing two
recent United States Supreme Court decisions that deal with
ADA preemption. In Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 86 the
Supreme Court held that the ADA "pre-empts the [s] tates from
prohibiting allegedly deceptive airline fare advertisements
through enforcement of their general consumer protection stat-
utes." 187 The court interpreted the language of the preempting
provision as being very broad in scope and "deliberately expan-
sive. ' 188 With this method of construction, the court stated,
"[s] tate enforcement actions having a connection with, or refer-
ence to airline 'rates, routes, or services' are pre-empted [by the
ADA]. 189 Although general consumer protection statutes were
found to be preempted, the court did not rule out all state ac-
tions. Concerning state advertising restrictions on air fares, the
court allowed that "'[s]ome state actions may affect [airline
fares] in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner' to have
186 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
187 Id. at 378.
188 Id. at 384 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987)).
189 Id.
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[a] pre-emptive effect." 190 The court cited a prohibition against
obscenity in advertising as an example.
In American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens,191 the United States
Supreme Court held that the ADA did not preempt a breach of
contract action by participants in a frequent flyer program com-
plaining of retroactive changes in the conditions of the pro-
gram, but did preempt an action for violations of state
consumer protection laws based on the same allegations. The
issue, as identified by the Court, was whether private actions
constituted a state enactment or enforcement of any law prohib-
ited by the preemption provision. 192 The Court found that a
suit for breach of contract did not involve the same potential for
intrusive state regulation as did a state consumer protection stat-
ute.1 93 One reason the Court gave for its reluctance to construe
the ADA to preempt simple contract claims was the lack of any
vehicle for resolving such disputes other than state court law-
suits. In dismantling the federal regulation of airlines, the
Court observed that Congress "indicated no intention to estab-
lish, simultaneously, a new administrative process for [the De-
partment of Transportation] adjudication of private contract
disputes."1 94 As in Morales, the Court hinted that other claims
might not be preempted.'95 In a footnote, the Wolens court
noted that: (1) the FAA required "an air carrier to have insur-
ance in an amount prescribed by the [Department of Transpor-
tation], to cover claims for personal injuries and property losses
resulting from the operation or maintenance of an aircraft;" and
(2) American Airlines did not urge that the ADA preempt per-
sonal injury claims relating to airline operations. 96 To the con-
trary, counsel for American acknowledged that safety claims, for
example, a negligence claim arising out of a plane crash, would
generally not be preempted. The Department of Transporta-
tion expressed a similar view, stating in a brief that it is unlikely
that the ADA procedurally preempts the personal injury claims
relating to airline operations. 197
190 Id. at 390 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 (1983)
(alteration in original)).
19, 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
192 See id. at 222.
193 See id. at 228-29.
194 Id. at 232.
195 See id. at 234.




With these precedents in mind, the Kiefer' 98 court dealt with
the question of whether a personal injury negligence action was
related to an airline's prices or services within the meaning of
the ADA. Based on the Morales court's definition of "related to,"
the Kiefer court found that "[s]uch a negligence action is not
related to airline rates and services quite as directly as the con-
tract claims in Wolens, but the impact of tort liability on an air-
line's rates and services is no less real." 199 The court noted "that
tort liability cannot but have, in Morales' words, 'a significant im-
pact upon the fares [airlines] charge,' just as the advertising
guidelines in [Morales] .-200
The court then turned to whether personal injury negligence
actions constitute enforcement of state law within the meaning
of the ADA. In answering this question, the court looked again
to Wolens. "Wolens draws a fundamental distinction between
'what the [s] tate dictates and what the airline itself undertakes.'
The former is pre-empted by the ADA; the latter is not. The
critical determination in applying this distinction is not whether
the [s] tate dictates, but what it dictates. 20 1 The court illustrated
that while suits on private contracts involve some enforcement
of state law, in the law of contracts, the duty to exercise ordinary
care is imposed by law, not voluntarily assumed. "Enforcement
of the duty through a common-law negligence action does not
merely give effect to 'privately ordered obligations' as a breach
of contract suit does."202 The court concluded:
With certain reservations, we think negligence law is not so pol-
icy-laden in imposing liability for personal injuries that suits for
damages like those before us are preempted by the ADA....
Common-law negligence actions to recover damages for personal
injuries do not impinge in any significant way on Congress' con-
cern. Such actions did not impair federal regulation before the
ADA, and we do not see how they impair deregulation since. 0
Thus, the Kiefer court held that the ADA did not preempt the
plaintiffs' state law negligence claims.
The plaintiff in Bullard v. Lehigh-Northampton Airport Author-
ityP°4 was an employee of Northwest Airlines. After the plaintiff
198 Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. 1996).
199 Id. at 281.
200 Id. (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 390).
20, Id. at 281-82 (quoting Wolens, 513 U.S. at 233).
202 Id. at 282 (quoting Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228).
203 Id.
204 668 A.2d 223 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
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slipped on a patch of ice on the tarmac between two aircraft
gates and fractured her leg, she brought a negligence claim
against the defendant. Plaintiff maintained that the airport had
piled ice and snow in a mound which melted and subsequently
froze into a patch of ice on which the plaintiff ultimately
slipped. The trial court held that the defendant was immune
because of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act,"°5 which
immunized political subdivisions against litigation arising out of
the work that a political subdivision does.
On appeal, the plaintiff maintained that her claim was within
the sidewalk exception to the Act. However, the court held that
an airport tarmac is not a sidewalk within the meaning of the
exception.20 6 Plaintiff then argued that her claim fell within the
real estate section of the Act. The court held that this was not so
and followed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which previously
held that these exceptions were to be narrowly construed and
that there must be an actual defect in the land itself.20" The
court stated that because the "dangerous condition was on,
rather than off the tarmac," summary judgment for the defend-
ant was appropriate.0 8
The litigation in Trinidad v. American Airlines, Inc.20 9 arose out
of turbulence allegedly encountered on an American Airlines
flight from New York to San Juan, Puerto Rico. According to
the plaintiffs, the plane encountered turbulence and dropped a
thousand feet in a very short time, resulting in personal injuries
to the plaintiffs who were passengers on the flight. The court
had to determine which law governed the standard of care that
American owed to its passengers. The plaintiffs contended that
state common law governing tort actions should apply. The de-
fendant maintained that such actions were preempted by the
ADA or, in the alternative, implicitly preempted by the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958.
The court had to determine whether all of the plaintiffs'
claims were expressly preempted by the ADA. The court found
that although the ADA preemption clause preempted many
state law causes of action, there was little guidance as to whether
205 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8541-42 (1982).
206 See Bullard, 668 A.2d at 225.
207 See id. at 225-27 (citing Kiley by Kiley v. City of Philadelphia, 645 A.2d 184,
187 (Pa. 1994)).
208 Id. at 227.
209 932 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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a state law negligence claim is preempted by the ADA.2 10 For
guidance, the court looked to Morales v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc.,2 l in which the Supreme Court stated that state laws relat-
ing to rates, routes, or services were preempted, but left the
term "services" undefined.2 12 The Trinidad court looked to vari-
ous federal court of appeals and other district court decisions to
arrive at its conclusion that "plaintiffs' claims do not involve tick-
eting, boarding, in-flight service and the like," but were safety-
related and thus "not expressly preempted by the ADA. '213 The
court then turned to the question of whether the plaintiffs'
causes of action were implicitly preempted by the ADA. The
court stated that it must decide "whether the statute's structure
or purpose 'indicate [s] an intent to occupy an entire field of
regulation.' ' 214 The court concluded that after an examination
of the legislative history of the ADA preemption clause, no such
congressional intent to occupy the regulatory field was
intended.215
The court lastly determined whether the plaintiffs' causes of
action were implicitly preempted by the 1958 Federal Aviation
Act. The defendants maintained that the Act, out of which
came numerous federal aviation regulations, implicitly pre-
empted state common law litigation of the same. 6 The court
was not persuaded.2 17 The court also found little case history to
support the defendant's propositions. In the cases where the
Act was held to have preemptive force, the preemptive matter
was municipal regulations or ordinances which directly ad-
dressed the flight operations of airlines.2 18 The court held that
those cases were clearly distinguishable from the case at bar and
deemed that the plaintiffs' cases were governed by the New York
state common law of negligence.1
210 See id. at 524.
211 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
212 See id. at 383-85.
213 Trinidad, 932 F. Supp. at 526 (citation omitted).
214 Id. (citing Levy v. American Airlines, No. 90 CIV. 7005 (LJF), 1993 WL
205857, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.June 9, 1993), affd, 22 F.3d 1092 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation
omitted)).
215 See id.
216 See id. at 527.
217 See id.
218 See id.
219 See id. at 527-28.
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The plaintiff in Stark v. Port Authority of New York & New
Jersefy20 was an employee of Pan Am World Airlines who was in-
jured when she fell on a deteriorated sidewalk at John F. Ken-
nedy International Airport. She appealed a lower court decision
granting summary judgment to the defendant.
The court found that Pan Am had leased the area where the
plaintiff fell.22' The court noted that "[i]t is well settled that an
out-of-possession owner or lessor is not liable for injuries that
occur on the premises unless the owner or lessor has retained
control over the premises or is contractually obligated to repair
or maintain the premises. '222 The court found that the defend-
ant was not obligated to repair the sidewalk and had no control
over the premises. 3  Thus, the court held that summary judg-
ment was appropriate. 24
The case of Gardner v. U.S. Air Inc.2 25 arose when a firefighter
injured his knee while participating in a rescue operation after
the crash of a U.S. Air flight at LaGuardia Airport in New York.
The court stated that his claim was barred by the Fireman's
Rule, New York General Municipal Law section 205-A, which
provides that a firefighter cannot recover damages from acci-
dents arising out of fighting fires because of the inherent risks
in such a job. 6
Plaintiff argued that New York General Business Law section
245(1),22' relating to reckless operation of aircraft, provided an
exception to the Fireman's Rule. The court stated that section
245(1) did not trigger an exception to the Fireman's Rule be-
cause it was not concerned with fire hazards or safety.2 2 8 The
court reasoned that the violation of such law would not create
more hazards for a firefighter than he already normally faced. 9
Thus, the court ruled in favor of the defendant.2 0
220 639 N.Y.S.2d 57 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
221 See id. at 58.




25 634 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
226 See id. at 499-500.
227 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 245(1) (McKinney 1988).
228 See Gardner, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
229 See id. at 500.
230 See id. at 499.
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D. GENERAL AvIATION REVITALIZATION ACT OF 1994
The litigation in Altseimer v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.2 3 1 arose
out of a helicopter accident. The plaintiffs filed an action for
personal injuries, property damage, and economic losses arising
out of the accident against Bell Helicopter Textron (Bell),
which manufactured the helicopter. In their complaint, the
plaintiffs alleged that Bell designed a defective helicopter and
forty-two degree gear box (an integral component part of the
helicopter). The complaint further alleged that Bell failed to
provide proper warnings with respect to the design of the heli-
copter and gear box.
Bell moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the
General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA) 232 prohib-
ited a lawsuit against it because the aircraft was more than eight-
een years old, and the helicopter had been rebuilt twice before,
terminating any liability of Bell as the original manufacturer. In
reaching its decision, the court first analyzed GARA. GARA is a
statute of repose which limits the liability of aircraft manufactur-
ers arising out of accidents in which the aircraft or component
part is more than eighteen years old.23 3 The court found that
Bell had provided evidence that the helicopter and gear box
were more than eighteen years old at the time of the crash. 234
"Therefore, GARA effectively preempts plaintiffs' action."235
The court acknowledged that the result was "harsh," but stated it
was consistent with the purpose of GARA, which was to protect
general aviation manufacturers from litigation arising out of air-
craft and parts that are remotely removed from those manufac-
turer's control.236 The court thus granted summary judgment
for Bell.237
The decedent in Rickert v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.3 8
died while trying to land an aircraft manufactured by Mitsubishi
at the Casper, Wyoming Airport. The decedent's estate alleged
that the plane, a Mitsubishi MU-2B-35-J, was defectively and neg-
231 919 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Cal. 1996).
232 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (1994) (time limit on civil actions against aircraft
manufacturing).
293 See Altseimer, 919 F. Supp. at 342.
234 See id.
235 Id. at 342.
236 See id.
237 See id. at 343.
238 923 F. Supp. 1453 (D. Wyo. 1996), revd on reh'g, 929 F. Supp. 380 (D. Wyo.
1996).
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ligently designed and based their claims on negligence and
strict liability. Mitsubishi moved for summary judgment based
on GARA.
The court found that GARA applied because Mitsubishi sold
the aircraft twenty-one years ago.239 However, the plaintiff al-
leged that an exception to GARA's protective liability provisions
applied, namely the "knowing misrepresentation" exception.2 4
This exception applies when the plaintiff can show that the de-
fendant placed the product in the stream of commerce knowing
that it was defectively manufactured. 241 The court, however,
found that the plaintiff's evidence attempting to show this mis-
representation and fraud consisted of "innuendo and inference"
and stated that GARA required specificity, which the plaintiff
was unable to show. 24 2 Thus, the court granted Mitsubishi sum-
mary judgment.
The court in the unreported opinion of Cartman v. Textron
Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division2 43 stated that the defend-
ant, an aircraft component part manufacturer, was entitled to
summary judgment because the plaintiff's evidence failed to sat-
isfy GARA's "knowing misrepresentation or concealment" ex-
ception.24 The court held that the plaintiff could not utilize
this exception merely because the defendant did not notify the
FAA about safety concerns regarding a part.245
E. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The decedent in Green v. Cessna Aircraft Co.24 crashed while
trying to land his Cessna Seaplane on Togus Pond near Augusta,
Maine. His estate brought a products liability action against
Cessna, alleging that a cable which controlled the airplane's
flaps broke and caused the plane to crash. Cessna moved for
summary judgment claiming that there was no evidence show-
ing that the failure of the cable caused the crash. Cessna instead
presented experts who opined that the cable broke during the
crash, not before.
239 See id. at 1456.
240 See id.
241 See id.
242 See id. at 1462.
243 No. 94-CV-72582-DT, 1996 WL 316575 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 1996).
244 Id. at *3.
245 See id.
246 673 A.2d 216 (Me. 1996).
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The court stated that "there simply are no facts in evidence
that this plane crash resulted from a failed . .. cable. '247 The
court found that because there was ample evidence to support
the inference that the crash was caused by pilot error, summary
judgment was appropriate.248
F. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE To PRODUCTS
LIABILITY ACTIONS
The plaintiff in Strickland v. Royal Lubricant, Inc.249 was an air-
craft mechanic who was working underneath a Chinook helicop-
ter when hydraulic fluid sprayed into his face. The defendant
moved for summary judgment asserting the government con-
tractor defense. This defense shields contractors from liability
under state law for design defects in products made and deliv-
ered to the United States Government if the contractor is found
to be following government specifications.
The court denied the summary judgment motion because it
found that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether
military specifications were reasonably precise with regard to the
toxicity of the hydraulic fluid.250 Because the record was silent
on this issue, genuine issues of fact were found to exist.2 51 The
court said "[t]he specifications here . . . provide considerable
discretion to the contractor in formulating the components of
the product. '252 Thus, the court found that there was no "man-
ufacturer's dilemma" about rigid specifications to follow and de-
nied the defendant's summary judgment motion.5 5
The decedent in Tate v. Boeing Helicopters 2 4 died when the
Army helicopter in which he was flying crashed. The decedent's
estate brought a products liability action against the manufac-
turer of the helicopter alleging design defect and failure to warn
regarding the helicopter's tandem hook system. The defendant
moved for summary judgment based on the government con-
tractor defense.
247 Id. at 218.
248 See id. at 220; see also Altseimer, 919 F. Supp. at 341-42 (discussing GARA).
249 911 F. Supp. 1460 (M.D. Ala. 1995).




254 921 F. Supp. 1562 (W.D. Ky. 1996).
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The court followed the test set out by the Supreme Court in
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,255 which states that a defendant
can avoid liability when a cause of action is brought under a
state law that imposes liability for a failure to warn in using mili-
tary equipment if: (1) the United States exercised discretion
and approved the warnings; (2) the contractor provided con-
forming warnings; and (3) the contractor warned the United
States of the dangers that the contractor, but not the United
States, knew about.256
The district court found that the Army had exercised discre-
tion over the development of the warnings and then approved
them by reviewing the helicopter manuals.2 57 Also, the Army
had the final input with respect to what the manual con-
tained.258 Next, the court found that Boeing had provided con-
forming warnings because they were providing manuals, which
had been approved by the Army, to the end users.2 5 9 Finally, the
court found that Boeing had made the Army aware of all the
dangers of which Boeing itself was aware. 260 Thus, the defend-
ant was entitled to summary judgment under the government
contractor defense. 61
The controversy in In re Air Disaster at Ramstein Air Base, Ger-
many 62 arose when a C-5A Air Force aircraft crashed on takeoff
from an Air Force base in Germany. The survivors of those
killed in the crash filed suit alleging claims of negligence and
products liability. The defendants, the manufacturers of the
plane, claimed the government contractor immunity defense to
the negligence action. 3
The court of appeals followed the reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.264 for
determining liability for design defects in military equipment.
The Supreme Court held that such liability
cannot be imposed, pursuant to state law when (1) [the] United
States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equip-
255 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
256 See id. at 512.
257 See Tate, 921 F. Supp. at 1566-67.
258 See id. at 1567.
259 See id. at 1568.
260 See id.
261 See id.
262 81 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 1996).
263 See id. at 573.
264 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
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ment conformed to the specifications; and (3) the supplier
warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the
equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the
United States.2 65
The court of appeals found that the first part of Boyle was satis-
fied because the Air Force had approved reasonably precise
specifications and because they reviewed, evaluated, and tested
the C-5A.266 The court stated that such involvement "clearly im-
plicates the [g] overnment's discretionary function and approval
of reasonably precise specifications."267
The court then moved to the second part of the test and
found that the plane had conformed to the Air Force's specifica-
tions.268 The plaintiff challenged this conformity and claimed
that the plane was not in conformity because it was not "fail-
safe."269 However, the court dismissed this and described the
specification of "failsafe" as a "vagary" and thus not relevant.2 70
The court then turned to the last part of the Boyle test and
sought to determine whether an adequate warning of the dan-
gers was given to the Air Force by the manufacturer. The court
found that an Air Force engineer had been involved in the de-
velopment and implementation of the aircraft part that ulti-
mately failed.2 71 Thus, "the Air Force was aware of any safety
implications created by the design of the electrical circuit."272
The court then turned to the products liability claim and
found that any defect was an "open and obvious" danger.2 73
The court stated that because the danger was a physical fact and
because the Air Force was deeply involved in the development
of the plane, it should have known of any dangers that ex-
isted.274 The court thus held for the plaintiffs.
265 Id. at 512.
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G. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The litigation in Vaughn v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.2 75 arose
when the plaintiff alleged that a Northwest agent incorrectly in-
formed her that she could only check two items of baggage with-
out paying an additional penalty. Because the plaintiff was
unable to pay the penalty fee, she had to lift, carry, and stow her
luggage onto the plane. While doing so, the plaintiff allegedly
suffered an injury diagnosed as a "frozen shoulder."
The plaintiff brought her claims under the Air Carriers Access
Act 2 76 and the Rehabilitation Act.277 Neither statute provided
for a statute of limitations for bringing such claims. A lower
court dismissed both of her claims on the ground that they were
time-barred because of a one-year statute of limitation, which
the court borrowed from the Minnesota Human Rights Act.278
The plaintiff argued that the Minnesota six-year statute of limita-
tions should apply instead of the one-year statute of limitations.
Ultimately, the Minneapolis appellate court concluded that the
six-year statute of limitations applied because of the need for




The chief issue in Zicherman v. Korean Airlines Co.280 was
whether a plaintiff may recover damages for loss of society re-
sulting from the death of his relative in a plane crash in a suit
brought under the Warsaw Convention.
Korean Airlines Flight 007 was shot down over the Sea of Ja-
pan on September 1, 1983, by military aircraft of the Soviet
Union. Nearly 300 people were killed, including the brother
and son of the plaintiffs in this action. Plaintiffs filed suit
against Korean Airlines, seeking, among other things, damages
for loss of the decedents' society and companionship and for
the decedents' conscious pain and suffering.
275 546 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), affd in part, revd in part, 558 N.W.2d
736 (Minn. 1997).
276 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (1994).
277 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
278 See Vaughn, 546 N.W.2d at 46.
279 See id. at 50.
280 116 S. Ct. 629 (1996).
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In a consolidated proceeding for common issues of liability
and for the many claims against Korean Airlines, a trial court
jury found that the destruction of the airplane was proximately
caused by the willful misconduct of the aircraft's flight crew,
thus lifting the Warsaw Convention's $75,000 cap on dam-
ages.2 18 1 At the damages trial, Korean Airlines maintained that
the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) was the correct vehi-
cle for determining the proper claimants and the recoverable
damages and that damages for loss of society were not proper.
The district court denied Korean Airlines' motion on that point
and held that the plaintiffs could recover for loss of love, affec-
tion, and companionship. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, however, set aside this award and, in applying general
maritime law, held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover
loss of society damages, provided that they were dependents of
the decedent at the time of death. The plaintiffs then peti-
tioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, maintaining that
under general maritime law, dependency is not a requirement
for recovering loss of society damages.
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Supreme Court, asked
initially whether loss of society of a relative is recoverable under
the Warsaw Convention. Complicating the analysis of such a
question is the fact that the Warsaw Convention was written in
French, and the translation of it has proved troublesome for
courts in the United States. The principal problem is determin-
ing the meaning of dommage. After examining the wide array of
possibilities that could be ascribed to the word, Justice Scalia in-
terpreted "dommage" as meaning "legally cognizable harm," but
noted that the article in which the word appears leaves it to the
determination of the adjudicating courts in respective countries
to specify just what harm is cognizable. 82
After determining that the United States was the sovereign
whose domestic law applied, Justice Scalia dismissed the Second
Circuit's attempt to have maritime law govern all causes of ac-
tion that arise under the Warsaw Convention, and instead de-
cided that because of the nature of the case, Justice Scalia
applied DOHSA.283 DOHSA provided that recovery "shall be a
fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by
281 See id. at 631.
282 See id. at 633.
283 See id. at 636-37.
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the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought."284 Since
DOHSA permitted recovery for pecuniary damages only, the
plaintiffs could not recover loss of society damages.
Hollie v. Korean Airlines Co.285 was a pre-Zicherman case similarly
arising out of the downing of Korean Airlines Flight 007. Like
the other cases in this section, the main issue in Hollie revolved
around the damages awardable to the plaintiffs. Specifically, the
primary question was whether damages for pain and suffering,
loss of support, loss of nurture and guidance, grief of survivors,
and loss of society could be recovered by the decedent's
relatives.
Contrary to the later cases of Zicherman and Bickel, the court in
Hollie declined to apply DOHSA. Instead, the Second Circuit
looked to a much broader scope of federal maritime law to an-
swer the questions presented. 86 The court awarded loss of sup-
port damages to the decedent's brother because it found that
the evidence presented at trial supported the proposition that
the decedent had supported the brother for a good part of his
life and would have continued to do so for the remainder of her
working life. 8 7 A similar result may have been found had
DOHSA been applied in this case, because this was a pecuniary
damages claim allowable under DOHSA.
The court did not award damages for loss of nurture and gui-
dance to the decedent's nieces and nephews because, although
she had a significant influence on the children's lives, she was
not in the parental role, and as such, did not fill the position
required for a recovery of nurture and guidance damages. The
decedent's survivors were not allowed to recover damages for
grief because federal maritime law did not permit such dam-
ages.2 88 The loss of society damages issue was remanded back to
the district court for a further finding of fact of whether the
decedent's survivors fell into the class of dependents who can
recover for such damages.
Bickel v. Korean Airlines Co.289 also involved the downing of Ko-
rean Airlines Flight 007. After the degree of liability attributable
to Korean Airlines was established as willful misconduct, the liti-
gation turned to the issue of damages. Recovery for injuries and
284 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1975).
285 60 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 808 (1996).
286 See id. at 92.
287 See id. at 93.
288 See id. at 95.
289 83 F.3d 127 (6th Cir. 1996), modified by, 96 F.3d 151 (6th Cir. 1996).
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deaths arising on international commercial flights is limited by
the Warsaw Convention to $75,000.290 However, that limitation
is waived if the air carrier is found to have engaged in willful
misconduct. 91 The plaintiffs in this case were survivors of five
of the people killed during the crash. The damages issue cen-
tered around whether the plaintiffs' non-dependent relatives
were beneficiaries and, as such, entitled to recover pecuniary as
well as non-pecuniary damages.
The Bickel court followed the recent Supreme Court case of
Zicherman v. Korean Airlines Co., which held that the domestic law
of a party country to the Warsaw Convention determined who
can bring an action and what damages they can recover.2 92 To
do this, the Sixth Circuit applied a federal choice of law rule.293
The court considered a number of factors in deciding which fo-
rum should govern the outcome of this case. The factors that
the court found most significant were: (1) the needs of the in-
terstate and international systems; (2) the relevant policies of
the forum; (3) the relevant policies of other interested states;
(4) the relative interests of those states in the determination of
the particular issue; (5) the protection ofjustified expectations;
(6) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law; (7)
certainty; (8) predictability; (9) uniformity of results; and (10)
ease in the determination and application of the law to be ap-
plied. 94 Using these factors, the court decided that the law of
the United States should govern the case. 95
Bickel also involved claims for loss of society, and survivors'
grief damages. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals followed the
analysis of the Supreme Court in Zicherman, which stated that
DOHSA was the internal law of the United States that governed
these types of cases. DOHSA permitted only pecuniary dam-
ages, and the Zicherman Court determined that loss of society
damages were not pecuniary and could not be recovered under
the act.2 96 Although the Zicherman Court did not directly ad-
dress the issues of survivors' grief damages and pain and suffer-
ing damages, the Bickel court determined that the DOHSA
limitation on non-pecuniary damages also applied to these types
290 See id. at 129.
291 See id.
292 See 116 S. Ct. at 634.
293 See Bicke4 83 F.3d at 130.
24 See id. at 131.
25 See id.
29 See Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 637.
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of damages. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit held that the plain-
tiffs could not recover these damages either. 97
Forman v. Korean Airlines Co. 29 8 was another post-Zicherman case
in which the plaintiffs sought damages for the decedent's pre-
death pain and suffering, loss of financial contributions, house-
hold services, grief, anguish, and loss of society. Because of the
Supreme Court's recent Zicherman decision, the Forman court
did not allow loss of society or mental grief damages.2 99 The
question arose, however, as to whether pre-death pain and suf-
fering damages were pecuniary damages, the sort of damages
seen by the Court in Zicherman to be compensable. The Forman
court stated that "[t]he key factual dispute turns on whether the
passengers were immediately rendered unconscious." 00 The
court relied on expert testimony and decided that the evidence
"permits the inference that [the plaintiff] survived the missile
impact, remained conscious despite the airplane's decompres-
sion, and experienced decompression-related pain." 01 The
court thus allowed pre-death pain and suffering damages.
The court found the loss of financial contributions damages
issue difficult because the plaintiff had only recently received
her green card, and, thus, any previous earnings were of limited
value as to predicting her future earnings for the determination
of such an award.112 The court decided that, "[s] ince [the plain-
tiffs] pre-green card work history could be legitimately disre-
garded in predicting her future earnings, we think that [the
plaintiffs] expert's reliance on data concerning the average wo-
man of [the plaintiffs] age and education was permissible."30 3
B. LIMITED LIABILITY
The case of Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France30 4 involved
rain damage to carpets after transport by Air France from Aus-
tria to Virginia. The plaintiff, a carpet dealer, arranged to have
575 carpets flown from Salzburg, Austria, to John F. Kennedy
International Airport in New York City on an Air France aircraft.
The carpets were transported by truck from New York City to
297 See Bicke, 83 F.3d at 132.
298 84 F.3d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
299 See id. at 448.
300 Id. at 449.
301 Id.
302 See id. at 450.
303 Id.
304 78 F.3d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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Dulles Airport. The truck delivery was done by Dynair, Air
France's cargo agent. At Dulles, Dynair's warehouse facility was
full, so in accordance with their usual practices, its employees
stored the carpets outside, and covered them with heavy gauge
plastic. Five days after the carpets arrived, one-third of an inch
of rain fell at Dulles Airport. The precipitation damaged eighty-
six carpets as a result of water seeping through the plastic. The
plaintiff then sued Air France for the damage.
An air carrier's liability for damage of cargo is limited by the
Warsaw Convention to a sum of 250 francs per kilogram. 30 5
However, such a limitation is inapplicable when the carrier is
proved to have engaged in willful misconduct. 30 6 The plaintiff
maintained that Air France and Dynair's conduct amounted to
willful misconduct.
The lower court found that Air France had inadequately
packed the carpets in a manner inconsistent with its stated pro-
cedures.0 7 It also highlighted the fact that Dynair had left the
carpets outside once it started to rain.30 8 Based on these factors,
the lower court found that Air France could not use the Warsaw
Convention's limited liability rules because their actions and
those of their agent, Dynair, amounted to willful misconduct.30 9
Air France appealed, arguing that the lower court applied the
standard for misconduct when in fact it should have used the
standard for willful misconduct.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "From our earliest
cases under the Warsaw Convention, we have treated reckless
disregard as equivalent to willful misconduct.""'0 Although the
court could not find any clear definition of how previous courts
had defined reckless disregard, it did point out that, "we have
never held that negligence-gross or otherwise-would suffice
to make out willful misconduct."31' The court concluded that if
the plaintiff was to show willful misconduct on the part of Air
France, he "must prove that the defendant was subjectively
aware of the consequences of his act-not necessarily that it
would cause the exact injury, but at least that it was certainly
505 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1988).
306 See Saba, 78 F.3d at 666.
507 See id.
508 See id.
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likely to cause an injury to the plaintiff."3 12 In applying this stan-
dard to the facts of the case, the Court of Appeals found that:
"There was no evidence presented in this case that could meet
the test of willful misconduct or its equivalent, reckless disre-
gard.... [Although the carpets had been packed inadequately,
the plaintiff could not show] that the packers knew that the
cargo was likely to be left outside in inclement weather."" 3 Ad-
ditionally, no evidence was shown that the Dynair employees
could anticipate rain or that they would have thought that the
packaging over the carpets was inadequate. 1 4
The plaintiffs in Siben v. American Airlines Inc. 31 5 were honey-
mooners traveling from New York City to Anguilla. During the
flight, American lost one of the two bags they had checked at
the airport in New York City. Although American found and
returned the bag on the last day of their honeymoon, the plain-
tiffs had their vacation disrupted and discovered that a forty-
year-old shawl of sentimental value was missing from the bag.
The plaintiffs alleged four causes of action that the defendant
attempted to have preempted by the limited liability provisions
of the Warsaw Convention or, in the alternative, to be dismissed
for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The court first addressed whether the Warsaw Convention ap-
plied to this cause of action. The plaintiffs argued that two ex-
ceptions to the Warsaw Convention regarding liability applied
that negated the air carrier's liability protections. First, willful
misconduct on the part of the air carrier foreclosed a carrier
from enjoying the limited liability status. The court accepted
this first exception. 1 6 The court also accepted the plaintiffs'
second exception-that American improperly filled out a bag-
gage check which should have contained three vital elements
(ticket number, notice of the Warsaw Convention's applicability,
and the number and weight of items).317 Thus, the provisions of
the Warsaw Convention did not preempt the plaintiffs'
litigation.
The court then moved to the plaintiffs' four causes of action
and reviewed them to determine whether to grant American's
312 Id. at 668.
313 Id. at 670.
314 See id.
315 913 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
316 See id. at 277.
317 See id.
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motion to dismiss.31 8 Plaintiffs' first claim was fraud. American
claimed the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the falsity and intent re-
quirements for fraud under New York law. The court stated,
however, "Plaintiffs' allegations that American told them repeat-
edly that the suitcase had been found coupled with the knowl-
edge that it had not been, are sufficient to state a claim for
fraud."3 9 Thus, this claim survived the defendant's motion to
dismiss.
The court then addressed the plaintiffs' claim for negligent
misrepresentation. The plaintiffs alleged: (1) that American
employees falsely told them that the luggage had been found;
(2) that they relied on that information; and (3) that this reli-
ance was done to their detriment.32 0 The court held that these
allegations satisfied the elements of negligent misrepresentation
under New York law so these claims survived the defendant's
motion to dismiss. 21
The court, however, dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.32 The former failed because the plaintiffs
failed to allege conduct which allegedly endangered the plain-
tiffs' physical safety.32 3 The latter failed because the conduct in
question was not so outrageous nor extreme in character as to
go beyond the bounds of decency.3 24
The plaintiffs in In re Hijacking of Pan American World Airways,
Inc. Aircraft at Karachi International Airport, Pakistan on Sept. 5,
1986,323 were survivors of a hijacking. At the conclusion of ajury
trial consolidating eighteen separate actions filed against Pan
Am, the jury found that Pan Am's conduct in connection with
the Alert Security Program (ASP) constituted willful miscon-
duct.3 26 The ASP was a security measure taken by Pan Am in
response to threats against American air carrier international
flights. Pan Am advertised the ASP as providing increased secur-
ity for its flights through enhanced security measures. The jury,
however, found that Pan Am's willful misconduct was not the
318 See id. at 278.
319 Id.




324 See id. at 280.
325 920 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
326 See id. at 411.
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proximate cause of the damages claimed.327 After the trial, the
plaintiffs moved for a transfer of the remaining claims to the
Southern District of California on the ground that their reliance
on Pan Am's misrepresentations about ASP constituted claims
that were not common to those already tried. Pan Am claimed
that any remaining claims were preempted by the Warsaw Con-
vention and by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA).328
The court first addressed Pan Am's contention that the jury
erred when it found that Pan Am's behavior did not constitute
willful misconduct. Pan Am claimed that because of this, the
court should not even address the issue of its liability. 329 The
court rejected Pan Am's claim, pointing to "[a]mple evidence
. . . elicited at trial which rationally supports the jury's conclu-
sion that Pan Am made [fraudulent] misrepresentations of en-
hanced security measures in connection with [the ASP]." 3
However, the court then stated that it "must reject plaintiffs'
contention that since they allege actual reliance on defendants'
misrepresentations, they need not prove that those misrepresen-
tations were the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. 3 3 1 The
jury found that even if all the representations made about the
ASP had been true, the hijacking would still have occurred.3 2
Thus, the defendant's misrepresentation was not the proximate
cause of plaintiffs' injury.333
The court went on to state that even if the plaintiffs had
claims that were not preempted by the Warsaw Convention,
those claims were preempted by the ADA. 34 This preemption
occurred because "survival of [a] claim would be incompatible
with Congress' manifest intent to preempt all state law claims
pertaining to airline fares and services. '3 3  The court con-
cluded, "because the claims here are not 'tenuous, remote or
peripheral to' airline services,... but rather at their core, they
are preempted by the ADA."336
327 See id.
328 See id.
329 See id. at 412.
330 Id.
331 Id. at 413.
332 See id. at 411.
333 See id. at 413.
334 See id. at 414.
335 Id. at 415.
336 Id. (citation omitted).
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The plaintiff in Ajibola v. Sabena Belgium Airline337 attempted to
ship Nigerian baseball caps from Nigeria to the United States on
Sabena to celebrate the participation of the 1994 Nigerian
World Cup soccer team. The plaintiff had arranged for the
baseball caps to be shipped to Houston, Texas, by way of New
York City's JFK International Airport. However, the caps en-
tered the United States in Boston and were later routed through
New York. There was some dispute as to what happened to the
caps at this point, but the caps never arrived in Houston and
were later destroyed by U.S. Customs because of violations of
U.S. Customs regulations concerning trademark and copyright
laws. The plaintiff then filed suit in Bronx County Civil Court
claiming that Sabena failed to deliver the merchandise on time
and falsely collected repackaging money from them. The plain-
tiff moved for summary judgment on the basis that Sabena had
violated Articles 9 and 25 of the Warsaw Convention Agreement.
Sabena made a cross-motion to invoke the Warsaw Convention's
limited liability provisions.
The plaintiff relied on Article 9 of the Warsaw Convention,
which prevents a carrier from relying on the limited liability pro-
visions if the airway bill does not set out all of the necessary par-
ticulars.3 3 8 The plaintiff maintained that Sabena's failure to list
Boston on the airway bill as a stopping place was a violation of
Article 9.339 Sabena claimed that it should not be responsible
for an Article 9 violation because a carrier may add an un-
scheduled, unlisted stopover point in the case of necessity.3 1
However, the court could find no evidence that it was routed
out of necessity.34 1 The court granted the plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment under Article 9 and denied the defendant's
motion for summary judgment.34 2
The defendant in Bell v. Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd. 43 ap-
ealed a judgment after a non-jury trial awarding the plaintiff
12,500, plus interest and disbursements. The plaintiff filed suit
after the loss of his laptop computer following a pre-boarding
security check for an international flight. The New York
Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs proof was "insufficient
337 No. 95 Civ. 2479 (CSH), 1996 WL 271859 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 1996).
338 See 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1988).
339 See Ajibola, 95 Civ. 2479 (CSH), 1996 WL 271859, at *2.
340 See id. at *3.
341 See id.
342 See id. at *4.
343 25 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 17,259 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996).
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to support a finding that the loss resulted from [Swiss Air's] wil-
ful misconduct or equivalent conduct within the meaning of...
the Warsaw Convention.""' The court stated that under the
Warsaw Convention's restrictive standard of liability, the plain-
tiff was required to prove that Swiss Air had intentionally mis-
handled his laptop computer with knowledge or reckless
disregard of the probable consequences of its mishandling. 345
The court thus reduced the award from $12,500 to $200, the
amount prescribed by Article 22(2) of the Warsaw Conven-
tion.3 4 6 The plaintiff argued that because the Zurich State Po-
lice and not Swiss Air had required the plaintiff to check the
laptop computer as checked baggage, the Warsaw Convention's
limitation should not apply. The court disregarded this
argument. 3
47
C. ACCIDENT VS. WILLFUL MISCONDUCT
The litigation in Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd.3 48 arose when
the plaintiff was searched prior to an El Al flight from New York
to Tel Aviv. Plaintiff claimed that during the search, several
items were stolen from her baggage.349 She also claimed that
because of the search to which she was subjected, she suffered
from headaches, upset stomach, ringing in her ears, nervous-
ness and sleeplessness.35 °
The court first determined that the Warsaw Convention ap-
plied and that the plaintiffs claimed injury was an "accident"
within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.351
The United States Supreme Court, in Air France v. Saks,5 stated
that the definition of "accident" in Article 17 was that which is
an "unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external
to the passenger" and that it should be applied flexibly.3 53 The
federal district court held that what happened was an accident




346 See id. 17,259-60.
347 See id. 17,260.
348 919 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
349 See id. at 157.
350 See id.
35' See id. at 158.
352 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
353 Id. at 405.
354 See Tseng, 919 F. Supp. at 158.
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The court then looked to the Supreme Court's decision in
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. lcyd,' 55 in which the Supreme Court disal-
lowed any recovery for psychosomatic injuries unaccompanied
by bodily injury.35' The Tseng court found that the plaintiff sus-
tained no bodily injury because she was not injured by the per-
son who was searching her.3 57 The court stated, "On the
contrary, all of her personal injuries are attributable to her
shock and outrage at the way she was treated."358 The court dis-
missed the plaintiff's claims for personal injuries, but awarded
her $1,034.90 for her lost baggage. 59
D. JURISDICTION
The court in Aviateca, S.A. v. Friedman6° issued a writ of prohi-
bition that prevented a state court trial judge from hearing a
wrongful death action brought against Aviateca arising from the
crash of one of its aircraft. The court looked to Article 28(1) of
the Warsaw Convention which states that actions for damages
arising out of international air travel must be brought in one of
four places:
(1) The domicile of the carrier;
(2) the principal place of business of the carrier;
(3) the carrier's place of business through which the con-
tract of carriage was made; or
(4) the place of destination.361
Since the United States was not one of those four places, the
trial court judge did not have subject matter jurisdiction over
the claims.3 62
IV. FAA REGULATIONS
A. NON-RENEWAL/SUSPENSION OF PILOT'S CERTIFICATE
The case of Fried v. Hinson363 involved the Federal Aviation
Administration's (FAA) non-renewal of the plaintiffs desig-
nated pilot examiner's certificate. Claiming that this non-re-
newal was unjust, the plaintiff filed suit on administrative and
355 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
356 See id. at 552.
357 See Tseng, 919 F. Supp. at 158.
358 Id.
359 See id. at 160.
36 678 So.2d 387 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1996).
361 See id. at 388.
362 See id.
363 78 F.3d 688 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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constitutional grounds alleging violations of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) and the due process clause of the
Constitution.
The FAA issues designated pilot certificates for one year
terms, with renewal being necessary each year. Plaintiffs desig-
nated pilot examiner's certificate had been renewed annually
for approximately thirty years until the local FAA office chose
not to renew his certificate. The plaintiff protested to the re-
gional FAA office about the non-renewal and then to the Na-
tional Flight Standards Service Director, all of whom affirmed
the non-renewal. Thereafter, he filed suit alleging that the pro-
cedure by which the certificate was denied renewal was violated
the APA and due process clause because he was not given ade-
quate notice of his impending non-renewal and that he was not
given an opportunity to respond to the non-renewal decision.
Plaintiff's first contention was that the FAA violated the proce-
dure that its own rules prescribe.364 The court felt that the
plaintiff did not demonstrate "that the modified procedure
adapted by the FAA in this case resulted in substantial-or
any-prejudice [to the plaintiff]."365 The court stated, "An
agency is entitled to 'a measure of discretion in administering its
own procedural rules in such a manner as it deems
necessary. ' 3 6 6
Plaintiff's second contention was that the FAA violated the
plaintiff's constitutional right to procedural due process.367 The
court pointed out that the due process clause does not apply
unless the aggrieved individual can show that the government
action at issue deprives him of a natural interest in life, liberty,
or property.368 The plaintiffs contention was that he had a
property and a liberty interest that were infringed upon by the
FAA when it did not renew his designated pilot examiner's cer-
tificate.36 9 Addressing the property interest issue first, the court
stated that the plaintiff "had no cognizable property interest in
the renewal of his [designated pilot examiner's certificate] au-
thority because he had no legal entitlement to renewal. FAA
regulations allow the agency to determine whether to renew a
364 See id. at 690.
365 Id.
3 Id. at 691 (citation omitted).
37 See id.
68 See id.
36 See id. at 692.
122
AVIATION LAW DEVELOPMENTS
particular examiner each year."3 7' Because nothing in the rec-
ord showed that a pilot examiner had a guaranteed right to have
his certificate renewed, the court held that the plaintiff did not
have a property interest in that renewal. 71
The court similarly found no merit in the plaintiffs liberty
interest argument.3 72 It stated that "the entitlement [the plain-
tiff] seeks to preserve involves only performing a function of the
agency as its delegate; non-renewal leaves intact his basic liberty
to sell flight instruction services to willing private buyers. " 373
The court stressed that it was not deciding whether it would re-
view an FAA decision of whether to renew a pilot examiner cer-
tificate, but rather was merely limiting itself to the more narrow
issue of whether the procedures involved in this case were fair
and reasonable.7 4
In Gilbert v. NTSB, the FAA temporarily suspended the
plaintiff's pilot's license for safety violations. The plaintiff filed
suit, alleging that the NTSB acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
its handling of the matter in that the procedures used by the
FAA and the NTSB in suspending his license deprived him of
due process.
The controversy began when the FAA mailed the plaintiff a
notice that it intended to suspend his pilot's license for ninety
days because of safety regulation violations. Plaintiff requested
an informal conference, at which the parties did not resolve the
matter. The FAA administrator then issued an order suspending
his license for ninety days. Plaintiff appealed that order to the
NTSB, which affirmed the FAA's decision. Plaintiff then filed a
timely notice of appeal to the full Administrative Law Judge
Board at the NTSB. At this time, he obtained an extension of
time in which to file his appellate brief to the Board. Because of
a computer mishap, plaintiff's counsel was unable to file the
brief by the deadline and, instead, mailed it three days later. In
doing so, he did not attempt to obtain an additional extension
and did not mention the late filing. Because of this, the FAA
moved for dismissal on the ground that the brief was not timely
filed. The NTSB granted this motion, stating that while the
plaintiff may have demonstrated good cause for not filing the
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brief on time, he did not demonstrate good cause for failing to
request an additional extension before the filing deadline.
The court first looked to see whether it had jurisdiction to
review the plaintiffs constitutional claims. 376 An administrative
agency lacks authority to review challenges to the constitutional-
ity of statutes or regulations promulgated by such agency.3 77 Be-
cause of this, a petitioner need not exhaust the challenges
before seeking judicial review.17 8 "Thus, in conjunction with a
properly appealed adjudicative order from the NTSB, [the court
could] consider constitutional claims regardless of whether the
petitioner presented the claims to the NTSB."3 79 In this case,
the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of FAA and NTSB
procedures.3 8 0 These "agencies [were] without the power orju-
risdiction to adjudicate these constitutional claims."8 ' The
court pointed out, however, that
[a] petitioner... may not obtain judicial review simply by invok-
ing the term "due process." ... [D]ue process "is not a talismanic
term which guarantees review in this court of procedural errors
correctable by the administrative tribunal." . . . In the present
appeal, [the plaintiff's] claims do not allege mere procedural er-
rors. [Plaintiff] challenges the due process afforded him by the
FAA prior to imposition of the suspension of his pilot's license.
He also challenges, on due process grounds, the NTSB's author-
ity to adopt a strict procedural rule for the dismissal of his appeal
for what he characterizes as a minor procedural, nonprejudicial
defect.382
For these reasons, the court determined that it had
jurisdiction.8 3
Next, the court turned to whether the notice given to the
plaintiff was sufficient. The court looked to precedent that
stated that the procedure used by the FAA in issuing a petitioner
a written notice utilizing the informal conference did not de-
prive a petitioner of due process. 84 Plaintiffs case was weak-
ened further because he had a full evidentiary hearing before
an Administrative LawJudge and an opportunity to appeal that
376 See id. at 366.
377 See id. at 366-67.








decision to the full board.8 5 Thus, the court determined that
the plaintiff's first due process claim lacked merit.3 8 6
Plaintiff's second due process claim was that due process
rights "preclude[d] the NTSB from adopting and enforcing a
strict procedural rule [that would] permit it to dismiss an appeal
for failure to file a timely brief, when no prejudice from a late
filing would result."38 7 In dismissing this claim, the court stated,
"The NTSB is free to adopt and enforce a strict procedural rule,
so long as it applies the rule uniformly or with reasoned distinc-
tions."3 8 Because the plaintiff presented no evidence that the
NTSB did not apply this policy consistently, the court held that
this due process claim also failed. 8 9
Plaintiff's last argument was that "the NTSB acted arbitrarily
and capriciously by applying its strict rule to dismiss his appeal
because he did not file a timely appellate brief or request an
additional extension before expiration of the filing deadline."9 °
In determining whether the NTSB's actions were arbitrary or
capricious, the court must evaluate whether the NTSB "articu-
late[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a 'ra-
tional connection between the facts found and the choice
made.' ... The NTSB's decision must be based on the relevant
factors and may not constitute a clear error of judgment."391
The record revealed that the NTSB determined that "good
cause did not exist for [the plaintiffs] failure to request an ex-
tension before the expiration of the filing deadline." 92 After
the plaintiffs lawyer discovered the problem with his computer,
he could have filed an extension or done something else to no-
tify the NTSB of the problem. However, all he did was file the
brief late without disclosing the late filing, and even then, did
not request an extension of time to file it. Under these particu-
lar circumstances, the court decided that the NTSB did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously in determining that the plaintiff had
failed to establish good cause by failing to request an additional
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The plaintiff in Thomas v. Hinson'94 attempted to have an FAA
suspension of his pilot's license reversed. The plaintiff and an
employee of his company were flying a plane to St. Louis when
the incident, out of which the litigation arose, occurred. Ac-
cording to his statement to the FAA, plaintiff's employee was the
pilot monitoring the flight controls and the plaintiff was the
non-flying pilot. Plaintiff communicated with air traffic control,
called check lists, and set flaps. As they approached their desti-
nation, plaintiff's employee stated that he was lowering the land-
ing gear and moved the gear handle down. The plaintiff saw
that the handle had been pushed down, but did not make sure
that the gear down light on the cockpit panel was illuminated.
In fact, the landing gear had not gone down. When the plane
got a few feet from the runway, the plaintiff noticed that the
light was not on and directed his employee to go around. In the
process, the airplane's propellers scraped the runway. The
plane later landed safely.
After this incident, the FAA suspended both of their pilot's
certificates "for violating 14 C.F.R. section 91.13(a), which
states, 'No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reck-
less manner so as to endanger the life or property of an-
other.'"3 95  Plaintiff contended that this section was
unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous as it applied to him.396
His main argument was that there were no duties or responsibil-
ities for acts or omissions of a second pilot on a single pilot air-
craft, such as the one he was flying, and, thus, he had no notice
of a duty to verify that his employee had lowered the landing
gear and that his failure to do so would violate the FAA
regulation.3 9
The court stated that "[a] regulation is unconstitutionally
vague if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence a reason-
able opportunity to know what is prohibited."3 98 The court felt
that in this case, the regulation in question was clear enough
that the plaintiff should have known what was and what was not
prohibited. 399  Furthermore, the court stated that section
91.13(a) "does not limit its reach to a pilot-in-command or a
pilot who manipulates the flight controls," and said, "the regula-
394 74 F.3d 888 (8th Cir. 1996).







tion applies to any person who operates an aircraft."40 0 The
plaintiff did not challenge the assertion that he was actively in-
volved in the aircraft's operation. Thus, the court denied the
plaintiffs petition to review the decision because he was actively
involved in the aircraft's operation and had a clear duty under
section 91.13(a) not to operate the airplane in a way that endan-
gered the life or property of another.4 1
The plaintiff in Foster v. Skinney4 2 had his pilot's license re-
voked by the FAA in 1986 because of safety violations. This revo-
cation was later reduced to a suspension. In 1989, the FAA
again revoked the plaintiffs pilot license when he landed his
helicopter in a school yard. Again, this revocation was reduced
to a suspension. The plaintiff then brought an action for dam-
ages under the Fifth Amendment alleging thirteen claims of re-
lief, all relating to the FAA's and the NTSB's authority to revoke
pilot certificates and the administrative procedures that they
used to do so. Defendant then moved to dismiss based on the
following three theories.
First, the defendants maintained that the lower court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the case.403 The court of appeals agreed,
stating that challenges to review FAA procedures have their ex-
clusive jurisdiction in the court of appeals.40 4 Thus, the district
court properly dismissed two of the claims but not the other
eleven.
Second, defendants maintained that the plaintiffs failed to
state a claim for which relief could be granted. 05 The court
looked to its previous decision of Go Leasing, Inc. v. NTSB,4 °6 in
which the court held that the FAA has authority to select and
impose sanctions on certificate holders.40 7 Thus, for plaintiffs
claims numbered one through eight and ten through eleven,
the court found dismissal to be proper.4°s For the plaintiff's
ninth claim regarding the FAA's administrative authority to
delegate, the court found that it was not supported by case law
or the regulations and dismissed it as well.40 9
400 Id.
401 See id. at 890.
402 70 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
403 See id. at 1087.
40m See id. at 1088.
405 See id.
40 800 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir. 1986).
407 See Foster, 70 F.3d at 1088-89.
408 See id.
409 See id. at 1089.
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The litigation in Wagner v. NTSB4 ° arose when the NTSB sus-
pended Wagner's pilot certificate for ninety days. Wagner was a
pilot for Desert Airlines, a company that flew Sun World Inter-
national executives from place to place. On one of the flights,
the regular Beechcraft King Air that Desert Airlines used had
mechanical problems. Because Desert Airlines was interested in
buying a Learjet, it agreed to take a Learjet on a demonstration
flight to determine whether it wanted to buy the plane. The
demonstration flight would double as a flight for Sun World In-
ternational. The NTSB suspended the plaintiffs certificate, stat-
ing that he had flown a flight for which he was not qualified.
The court framed the issue as "whether a flight can be a 'dem-
onstration flight' under Part 91 of the FAA regulations, when a
person flying the airplane is considering the purchase, but the
paying customer does not know that it is a demonstration flight
on which it does not enjoy all the protections of Part 135."4"1
The central fact in this case was that the Sun World executives
knew nothing about the demonstration flight arrangements.
The court stated, "As far as the prospective seller of the Learjet
was concerned, this was a demonstration flight at no charge ....
[b]ut as far as the [Sun World executives] knew, this was a com-
mercial flight for which they would be billed."412
The court then analyzed the two FAA regulations in ques-
tion.413 Part 135 provides regulatory safeguards for air passen-
gers.41 4 Part 91 provides more liberal rules for such flights as
carrier training flights or demonstration flights.4 15 Wagner was
certified to fly the plane under Part 91, but not under Part 135.
The court stated, "We agree with the NTSB that the regulation
must be applied based on what the customers knew when its
executives boarded the plane, not upon arrangements unknown
to it between the owner and prospective purchaser of the air-
plane."41 6 The court concluded that "[u]nless all customers
making travel arrangements on a flight know that they are deal-
ing with a demonstration of an airplane for which no charge will
410 86 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 1996).
411 Id. at 929.
412 Id. at 930.






be made to some prospective purchaser of the aircraft, this Part
91 exception to Part 135 cannot apply."4 17
The plaintiff in Beauchemin v. NTSB 8 appealed an NTSB or-
der affirming an FAA revocation of his private pilot certificate.
In 1994, the FAA revoked the plaintiff's certificate because of his
previous conviction of drug possession and distribution. The
FAA concluded that the pilot lacked the qualifications to hold a
pilot's certificate because his conviction showed that he lacked
the degree of care, judgment and responsibility required of a
certificate holder. The plaintiff appealed the revocation to the
NTSB which affirmed the FAA's revocation order.
On appeal, the plaintiff maintained that revocation of his pi-
lot's certificate was punitive and constituted a violation of the
double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment." 9 The court
stated, "[T]he test of 'whether a civil sanction constitutes pun-
ishment in the relevant sense requires a particularized assess-
ment of the penalty imposed and the purposes that the penalty
may fairly be said to serve.' 420 The court looked to the case of
Pinney v. NTSB,42 in which the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated, "[I] t is reasonable to conclude that a pilot who has vio-
lated a drug trafficking statute is also likely to violate regulations
concerning air safety."42 2 Thus, the civil penalty assessed against
Beauchemin bears a reasonable relationship to the govern-
ment's interest in promoting air safety. 4 23 The court thus af-
firmed the NTSB's order.
In Richard v. Hinson,4 2 4 the plaintiff attempted to recover at-
torneys' fees and expenses after the FAA wrongfully revoked his
airman's certificate. His justification for attempting to receive
these attorneys' fees was the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA) .425 Under the EAJA, a citizen may recover his attorneys'
fees and expenses if his net worth is under $2 million and the
government agency is unable to show substantial justification for
its position against that individual.42 6 Plaintiff's application for
417 Id.
418 No. 95-9534, 1996 WL 384562 at *1 (10th Cir. July 10, 1996).
419 See id.
420 Id. at *1 (quoting U.S. v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989)).
421 993 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1993).
422 Id. at 203.
423 Beauchemin, 1996 WL 384562, at *2.
424 70 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2522 (1996).
425 5 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. 1995).
426 See id. §§ 504(a) (1), (b)(1)(B).
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fees and expenses was denied because his net worth exceeded
$2 million.427
The court deemed this to be an equal protection case, deter-
mined the proper standard under which to review the qualifica-
tion system, and then analyzed the purpose of the legislation to
determine whether it satisfied that standard.2 8 If a suspect clas-
sification or a fundamental right is impinged by the government
in the case, then a court should apply the standard of strict scru-
tiny. 429 In this case, the EAJA provision classified according to
wealth, which the court determined not to be a suspect classifi-
cation.430 Thus, the court applied the rational basis standard.
"Under the rational basis test, disparate treatment of similarly
situated groups is not unlawful if a rational purpose underlies
the disparate treatment and Congress has not achieved that pur-
pose in a patently arbitrary or irrational way. "431
The court reviewed the historical and statutory notes for the
EAJA, and found that the purpose of the EAJA was
to eliminate[,] for the average person[,] the financial disincen-
tive to challenge unreasonable government actions .... Rather
than restricting access, the EAJA broadens access to courts. The
net worth provision specifies the outer financial limits of the indi-
viduals who the legislature determined may forego challenging
the government because of the expense involved. This purpose
is legitimate.43 2
Thus, the court determined that the net worth provision of the
EAJA did not violate the plaintiff's equal protection
guarantees.43 3
B. REGISTRATION OF AIRCRAFT
The plaintiff in Air One Helicopters, Inc. v. FAA43 4 purchased a
helicopter from a Spanish company, Helisca Helicopters, and
then attempted to register the helicopter with the FAA as re-
quired by FAA regulations. However, the FAA refused to do so
claiming the helicopter was still registered in Spain. An aircraft
can not be registered in two countries pursuant to the Chicago
427 See Richard, 70 F.3d at 416.




432 Id. at 417-18 (citations omitted).
433 See id. at 418.
434 86 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 1996).
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Convention on International Civil Aviation. Air One attempted
to get a release from the Direccion General De Aviacion Civil
(DGAC), Spain's national aircraft registry, stating that the Span-
ish registration was no longer valid. The DGAC refused to do so
because there was a lien on the aircraft. However, evidence
showed that the corporation holding the lien no longer existed.
Still the DGAC refused to issue the release and, subsequently,
the FAA refused to register the helicopter because of the dual
registration.
After the court determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the
case because of the futility of further administrative appeals by
the plaintiff to the FAA, the court held that "the FAA's decision
to register the helicopter was contrary to law because the Span-
ish registration was no longer valid."435 The court stated that,
although Air One cannot prove the lien no longer exists, "the
reason it can't is not because the lien is valid, but because the
appropriate Spanish bureaucrat won't say the lien is no longer
valid-even though everyone concerned knows that it is no
longer valid."436
C. PENALTIES
United States v. Emerson437 was an attempt by the FAA to re-
cover a civil penalty for past violations by the defendants, an air
taxi company and its owner, of federal aviation law and to per-
manently enjoin future violations. The violations consisted of
thirty-seven separate violations, each of which was subject to a
civil penalty.
The government justified its penalty request because it
claimed that the defendant was a "seasoned violator who has re-
peatedly threatened public safety in the face of the FAA's en-
forcement activities."43 8 The defendants requested leniency
because of their attempts to mitigate the effects of their past
wrongs and their limited ability to pay a large fine. The FAA
requested a penalty of $8,500 for each of the thirty-seven viola-
tions. Some of the factors the court considered in deciding on
the amount of the fine included the fact that the defendants
had repeatedly violated FAA regulations; that they had repeat-
435 Id. at 883.
436 Id.
437 927 F. Supp. 23 (D.N.H. 1996), affd, 107 F.3d 77 (1st Cir.), petition for cert.
filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3815 (May 27, 1997) (No. 96-1901).
438 Id. at 27.
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edly been sanctioned for violations of federal aviation laws; that
their mitigation had not "discounted the gravity of the stipu-
lated violations;" that they had limited financial resources; and
that the FAA has an interest in deterrence through monetary
fines.4 39 Taking these issues into account, the court reduced the
fine from $8,500 per violation to $5,000 per violation, making
the total penalty payable by the defendants $185,000.i
The litigation in Cronin v. FAA"' arose when the Department
of Transportation (DOT) and the FAA promulgated regulations
for alcohol and drug testing for air carrier employees who per-
form safety sensitive functions. The regulations provided that if
an employee tested positive, he was to be permanently barred
from performing the same duties as before the drug test with
any employer. The plaintiffs, a pilot and a pilots' union, chal-
lenged the FAA's authority to promulgate such regulations on
due process grounds. The court found that although the pilot
and the union had authority to bring the claim, the claim was
not ripe for review because no employee had been subjected to
the employment ban without being accorded adequate due pro-
cess. *2 Thus, the court dismissed the case.443
V. CONTRACTS
A. AIR CARRIER TICKETS
In American Airlines, Inc. v. Austin,444 the United States de-
manded a refund of $2.5 million for airline tickets that the gov-
ernment purchased but never used between 1985 and 1989.
The crux of the dispute centered around the time limit within
which the purchaser of an airline ticket could claim a refund.
The court found that governmental regulations "address re-
funds for unused tickets but do not explicitly limit the govern-
ment's right to such refunds except that any recovery by offset
must be made within ten years."445 The tickets, which were iden-
tical to tickets sold to the general public, contained time limits
within which passengers had to seek refunds for unused tickets.
439 Id. at 28-29.
440 See id. at 29.
-1 73 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
442 See id. at 1131-33.
443 See id. at 1134.
- 75 F.3d 1535 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
445 Id. at 1538.
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The court framed the issue as, "whether the government is
entitled to refunds for tickets that it did not use, in spite of pro-
visions on the tickets, ticket inserts, and tariffs incorporated into
the tickets by reference, limiting the time for seeking such re-
covery."4 4 6 Central to the court's decision in this case was "that a
provision in a government contract which violates or conflicts
with a federal statute is invalid or void."
44 7
The court set out to decide whether the refund time limits in
the airline ticket agreements violated or conflicted with any stat-
utory right of the government. If so, the limits could not bar the
government from recovering refunds for unused airline tickets.
The court construed the applicable statute using the standard
tools of statutory construction.448 In looking at the language of
section 3726 of the Transportation Payment Act of 1 9 72 ,449 the
statute in question, the court stated, "Congress intended for the
government to recoup any advance payments made for trans-
portation it does not receive. . . . Furthermore, it placed no
time or other limitation on the government's recovery right."450
The court then looked at the legislative history of section 322
of the Transportation Payment Act of 1940,451 which had been
amended by the enactment of the Transportation Payment Act
of 1972.452 The court decided that Congress's purpose in enact-
ing the Transportation Payment Act of 1972 was to "permit pay-
ment for the transportation of persons or property for or on
behalf of the United States in advance of completion of the
transportation services, 'subject to later recovery by deduction
or otherwise of any payments made for any services not received
as ordered.'"4 53 At the time of this amendment, Congress did
not impose any limitations on the government's right to recover
advance payments for unused services.454 The Supreme Court,
in Schweiker v. Hansen,455 restated that it is "the duty of all courts




449 31 U.S.C. § 3726 (1994).
450 Id. at 1539.
451 See Pub. L. No. 92-550, § 322(b), 86 Stat. 1163, 1164 (codified as amended,
at 31 U.S.C. § 3726).
452 See Austin, 75 F.3d at 1538-41.
453 Id. at 1540 (citation omitted).
454 See id. at 1541.
455 450 U.S. 785 (1981).
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public treasury. '456 One such condition, as the court of appeals
saw it, was the ability of the government to recover payments for
such things as airline tickets when they do not use the serv-
ices. 457 "The airlines' ticket provisions limiting such recovery
are plainly inconsistent with the rights Congress granted the
government and are no bar to the government's right to re-
funds. This is especially true where, as here, federal transporta-
tion regulations implementing congressional policy, were part
of the agreements with the airlines."4 58 Therefore, the court
held for the government.459
The plaintiffs in Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc.460 filed class
action breach of contract actions against American and United
Airlines. In both actions, the plaintiffs alleged that the two air-
lines told them that if they canceled their previously purchased
tickets, they would be assessed a penalty of twenty-five percent of
the fare. However, when the plaintiffs canceled, they were pe-
nalized twenty-five percent of the total ticket price, which in-
cluded a federal transportation tax. The lower courts in both
actions granted the airlines summary judgment on the basis that
the actions were preempted by section 1305 of the Airline De-
regulation Act (ADA) .461 After numerous appeals, the plaintiffs
then filed petitions for certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs' petitions, va-
cated the previous judgments against them, and remanded the
case to the Illinois Appellate Court for further consideration in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in American Airlines, Inc. v.
Wolens.4 62
On remand, the Illinois Appellate Court observed that it had
previously relied on Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,463 in
which the Supreme Court interpreted section 1305 of the ADA
broadly and "found that.., state regulation of allegedly decep-
tive airline fare advertisements related to rates and was there-
fore preempted by section 1305 (a) (1)."464 However, the United
456 Id. at 788 (quoting Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385
(1947)).
45 See Austin, 75 F.3d at 1541.
458 Id. at 1541-42.
459 See id.
4w0 663 N.E.2d 54 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
461 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305 (c) (1) (1988) (revised without substantive change
and recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1994));Johnson, 663 N.E.2d at 55.
462 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
463 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
464 Johnson, 663 N.E.2d at 56.
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States Supreme Court in Wolens applied a new test for determin-
ing whether a claim is preempted. "The majority [in Wolens]
found that whether the claim related to rates, routes and serv-
ices was only one step in determining whether a claim is pre-
empted... "465 The Illinois court reasoned that Wolens focused
on the language in section 1305 that stated "no state shall enact
or enforce any law" and held that in order for there to be pre-
emption under section 1305, an action must involve an "enact-
ment or enforcement" of state law.466
In light of Wolens, the Illinois Appellate Court determined
that it must decide "whether this case involves an effort to hold
the airlines to their self-imposed contract terms offered by them
and accepted by the plaintiffs or whether it amounts to 'enact-
ment or enforcement' of a state law."467 The court stated that if
the obligation undertaken by the airline was solely self-imposed,
such a breach is not preempted. 468 However, if the source of the
obligation is a state law or policy, such a breach of that obliga-
tion is preempted.469
The court analyzed the plaintiffs' claims against the airlines
and agreed that the plaintiffs' "breach of contract claims do not
involve the enforcement of a state law, but rather, an agreement
between the airlines and plaintiffs. It is clear that the airlines
individually made their rate determinations without any inter-
ference or involvement from the state." 470 Thus, the court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs' breach of contract actions were not
preempted. 1
The controversy in Chukwu v. Board of Directors British Air-
ways47 2 arose when the plaintiff bought a ticket for his brother, a
resident of Nigeria, to fly from Lagos, Nigeria, to Grand Cayman
via New York and Miami on British Airways. His brother did not
have a visa for such travel when he arrived at the gate in Lagos,
and British Airways refused to board him. The plaintiff brought
suit to recover contract damages for the denial of boarding.
British Airways moved for summary judgment on three
grounds: (1) the plaintiff could not pursue his state law contract
465 Id.
466 Id. (citation omitted).





47 915 F. Supp. 454 (D. Mass. 1996).
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claims because they were preempted by section 1305 of the
ADA; (2) even if the claims were not preempted, the plaintiff
could not obtain relief because British Airways had already re-
funded the price of his ticket to him; and (3) the plaintiff was
not the real party in interest.473
In addressing British Airways' first ground for summary judg-
ment, the court looked to the United States Supreme Court case
of American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens.474 The district court observed
that Wolens "does not appear to limit the type of contracts ex-
empted from the ADA based on whether they involve 'rates,
routes or services.' 475 The court then agreed with British Air-
ways that "[the airline] undertook no 'privately ordered obliga-
tions' outside the terms of the British Airways Tariffs."47 6 The
court reasoned that because of the special status of tariffs and
the need for uniform application of them, "it appears reason-
able to conclude that Wolens did not intend to exclude them
from application of the ADA preemption provisions.
477
The court also held that even had there been a non-pre-
empted contract, British Airways did not breach its contractual
obligations, observing that tariffs may be binding on passengers
even if they do not know about them.47 Tariff number forty-five
allowed British Airways to deny boarding to a passenger if it de-
termined in good faith that the passenger's travel documents
were legally insufficient. Because the plaintiffs brother did not
have a visa when he boarded the plane in Lagos, the court held
that British Airways was justified in denying him boarding.4 79
Furthermore, tariff number twenty-five limited a passenger's re-
coverable damages to recovery of the refund value of the ticket
and tariff number fifty-five stated that British Airways was not
liable for any consequential or special damages.480 Thus, the
court granted British Airways summary judgment.411
473 See id. at 455.
474 513 U.S. 219 (1995).










The court in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Metropolitan Washington
Airports Authority482 attempted to analyze a series of lease agree-
ments between Northwest Airlines, Trans World Airlines
(TWA), and the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority
(MWAA) (an entity with jurisdiction over Washington National
Airport). The chronology of the dispute began in 1977 when
TWA and Northwest leased nine gates at the Unit Terminal at
Washington National Airport. This lease was called the Unit
Terminal Agreement (UTA). In 1986, MWAA entered into a
lease with all airlines operating out of the airport titled the 1990
Airport Use Agreement and Premises Lease (AUSPL). A spe-
cific provision in the AUSPL continued the UTA Lease Agree-
ment. In 1991, when Northwest contemplated developing
Washington National into a mini-hub, it acquired TWA's gates,
which were first leased in the UTA in 1977. The following year
in 1992, Northwest had a change of heart regarding the mini-
hub and sub-leased the gates it had acquired from TWA to three
other airlines. In 1995, the UTA Lease Agreement expired and
MWAA told Northwest that it would begin leasing the gates that
Northwest was sub-leasing to those airlines that were currently
using them. MWAA maintained that the UTA expired in 1995
and that it was free to lease the gates to anyone it chose. North-
west maintained that the UTA, as continued by the AUSPL, did
not expire until that agreement did in 2014.483 The court stated
that Northwest had to show a provision in the AUSPL Lease
Agreement that evidences its right to lease the gates beyond
1 9 9 5 .
4 4 Northwest was unable to show such an express provi-
sion. The court found that the UTA expired in 1995 and that
MWAA had the right to lease the gates after that time.48 5
The litigation in Paul Wholesale v. Department of Transportation
and Public Facilities48 6 arose when Anchorage International Air-
port (AIA) awarded a duty-free concession contract to the sec-
ond-highest bidder, the David Green Group. AIA chose not to
award the contract to the highest bidder (the plaintiff) because
the airport made the determination that the plaintiff did not
have the requisite retail experience. The plaintiff appealed the
482 924 F. Supp. 704 (E.D. Va. 1996).
4w See id. at 709.
484 See id.
485 See id.
48 908 P.2d 994 (Alaska 1995).
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airport's decision. While the appeal was pending, the airport
canceled its contract with the David Green Group. The plain-
tiff's appeal was then dismissed as moot. The David Green
Group and Paul Wholesale both appealed.
The Alaska Supreme Court found that the AIA, as a sub-
agency of the Alaskan government, had a reasonable basis to
cancel the bidding process on three grounds: (1) because of an
ambiguity in the bid specifications; (2) because of allegations of
impropriety in the bidding process; and (3) to avoid the cost
and delay of litigation.48 7 Thus, there were rational bases for
canceling the bidding process. As a result, the court found that
the original bid was moot and dismissed the appeals."'
The plaintiff in Wood County Airport Authority v. Crown Airways,
Inc. 489 was a lessor of hangar space at an airport. The defend-
ants, an air taxi operation, wished to expand and needed more
space to accommodate larger aircraft. The plaintiff and the de-
fendantjointly decided to build a new hangar and signed a lease
agreement providing for such construction in December 1992.
Subsequently, in July 1993, the cost of building the hangar in-
creased. In December 1993, Mesa Airlines bought the assets
and liabilities of Crown Airways. Then, in February 1994, Mesa
told the Airport Authority not to proceed with the construction
of the hangar. Finally, in June 1995, the Airport Authority can-
celed the hangar project and brought suit, alleging intentional
interference with contractual relations, breach of contract,
breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, and promissory
estoppel. The defendant moved for summary judgment.
The court held that the plaintiff was unable to show that
Crown had modified the lease because doing so would have re-
quired the use of parol evidence.4 90 The court found that be-
cause Mesa was not a party to the contract when the breach
occurred, Mesa could not have breached the contract.491 The
court awarded summary judgment for the defendants. 492
-7 See id. at 1004.
4N See id.
489 919 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.W. Va. 1996).
490 See id. at 966.
491 See id. at 968.
492 See id. at 969.
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C. ESSENTIAL AIR SERVICES
The litigation of Mesa Air Group, Inc. v. Department of Transpor-
tation4 93 arose when two commuter carriers terminated service to
two small towns following the Department of Transportation's
reduction in subsidies to those carriers under the Essential Air
Services Program (EAS).494 The EAS program enabled carriers
to serve small towns and cities, which would not otherwise have
air service, by providing subsidies to those carriers to offset
losses they would otherwise suffer.
The Department of Transportation entered into subsidy
agreements with the two plaintiffs, Mesa Air Group and WestAir
Commuter Airlines, to service communities in New Mexico, Ari-
zona, Wyoming, Colorado, and Kansas. Following Congress's re-
duction in the 1996 EAS budget, the Department of
Transportation instituted a program-wide reduction in subsidy
payments and service levels. Three weeks after this reduction,
Mesa informed the Department of Transportation that it would
terminate its service to Silver City, New Mexico, Kingman, Ari-
zona, Goodman, Kansas, and Lamar, Colorado. WestAir in-
formed the Department of Transportation that it would
terminate service to both Visalia and Merced, California. The
Department ordered the air carriers to continue service for
ninety days (the specified time period in the agreement for can-
celing routes) on the basis that this reduction in subsidy pay-
ments was not a termination of the EAS agreement and, thus,
the carriers were not free to terminate service unilaterally.
The court first answered the question of whether the Depart-
ment of Transportation's order reducing subsidy payments was a
departmental regulation or a contract.4 95 If it was the former,
then the regulatory interpretation would be given substantial
deference by the courts; if it was the latter, then it would be
subject to interpretation under regular contract law princi-
ples.4 96 The court looked to 49 U.S.C. section 41737(d)(1),
which states that "[t]he Secretary may make agreements ... to
pay compensation under this subchapter. An agreement by the
Secretary under this subsection is a contractual obligation of the
Government to pay the Government's share of the compensa-
493 87 F.3d 498 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
494 49 U.S.C. § 41731-41734 (1994).
495 See Mesa Air Group, 87 F.3d at 503.
496 See id.
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tion."497 The court, in interpreting this statute, stated that
"[t]he terms of the statute indisputably establish Congress' in-
tent to make the subsidy agreements contracts, not administra-
tive regulations. '4 8 The court concluded that the Department
of Transportation's orders were, in essence, new contracts
formed between the agency and the air carriers.499 Thus, the
court found that the ninety day termination notice period of the
previous agreement between the two parties was void and that
the air carriers were permitted to terminate their air service.500
D. AIRCRAFT LEASES
United Air Lines, Inc. v. ALG, Inc.501 evolved out of the lease of
a Boeing 747 aircraft from United to ALG. The plaintiff,
United, claimed that ALG failed to make payments for rent,
maintenance reserves, and insurance premiums. Additionally,
the plaintiff claimed that ALG did not return the aircraft as
specified, requiring United to ferry the aircraft from England to
the United States. The plaintiff filed suit and then moved for
summary judgment on five of its counts, as well as on three of
ALG's counterclaims.
ALG's counterclaims were that United failed to deal with the
defendant in good faith, that United fraudulently induced the
vice president of ALG to sign the contract, and that United
failed to perform a necessary inspection of the aircraft before
delivery.5 02 The court dismissed ALG's counterclaims, stating
"[b]ecause ALG does not explain how UAL's actions, if true,
constituted an abuse of any discretion granted by the [1] ease to
UAL, we hold that the defendant cannot proceed with its de-
fenses and counterclaims based on the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing."50 3 ALG relied on a phrase in the lease
which stated that the aircraft that was to be delivered by United
"was to 'have had permanently and properly repaired any dam-
age to the Aircraft that exceeds the requirements of the most
recent FAA-approved maintenance program for the Aircraft for
operation without restrictions. "'504 Although United pointed to
-7 Id. (alterations in original).
498 Id.
499 See id.
500 See id. at 506.
50, 912 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
502 See id. at 357-59.




another clause in the contract which provided for an "as-is
where-is" condition of the plane, the court stated that "where
ambiguities exist in a contract between two provisions, the more
specific provision relating to the same subject matter controls
over the more general provision. "505 Thus, the court applied
the more specific provision to the "as-is where-is" clause and de-
nied United's first motion for summary judgment.5 6
United argued that ALG waived any right it might have had to
a claim for rescission because its delay in doing so was exces-
sive.5 07 The court dismissed this, stating first, "it is unclear from
the record when ALG discovered facts which would alert it to a
claim of rescission," and second, "it appears that at most ALG
waited six months before seeking rescission, a significantly
shorter time period than was at issue in other Illinois cases
deeming the remedy waived." 50 8  The court thus denied
United's second motion for summary judgment. 0 9
United also moved for summary judgment on ALG's counter-
claim for negligence. ALG sought damages for lost profits from
the sublease and possible future relationships. The court
granted summary judgment for United, stating that "[s]ince
ALG claims to have lost only anticipated profits and future com-
mercial opportunities, it cannot maintain a tort claim for
negligence."510
United then moved for judgment on the pleadings on ALG's
fourth counterclaim, which alleged that by getting a third-party
air carrier to sign an adhesion maintenance contract, United in-
tentionally interfered with ALG's business and contractual rela-
tionship with the third-party. The court found that ALG's
allegations were sufficient to withstand a motion for judgment
on the pleadings and, thus, denied United's motion.5 11
505 I. at 360 (citation omitted).
506 See id.
507 See id.
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VI. INSURANCE
A. POLICY INTERPRETATION
The issue in Avemco Insurance Co. v. Pon6 12 was whether a
commercial purpose exclusion in an insurance policy barred
coverage for injuries arising out of an incident with a parachut-
ist. Avemco issued an aircraft liability policy to Nathan and Law-
rence Pond, providing bodily injury and property damage
coverage for their Cessna airplane. The policy stated: "This
[p]olicy does not cover bodily injury, property damage, or loss:
(1) [w]hen your insured aircraft is .. . (b) used for a commer-
cial purpose."513
Nathan Pond and his family occasionally performed in para-
chuting events under the name of "the Pond Family Skydivers."
On July 24 and 25, 1993, the Pond Family Skydivers performed
at an air show in Lebanon, New Hampshire. Of the monies re-
ceived for their performance, $200 was used to reimburse Na-
than Pond for the use of his airplane, with the balance to be
distributed among the other family members who were
skydivers. Unfortunately, on July 24, a nephew of the Pond
brothers jumped from the airplane and collided with another
plane, killing both him and the pilot of the other plane. The
estates of the decedents brought claims against Nathan arising
out of the two deaths. Avemco filed a declaratory judgment to
determine its obligation to defend and indemnify Mr. Pond in
the underlying action.
The policy's definition of commercial purpose included
"other use [s] of the airplane for which an insured person gets
money unless the money was reimbursable for a flight that is
incidental to [the insured's] business or job, as allowed a private
pilot by the [Federal Aviation Administration]."514 The court
determined that the $200 Nathan was to receive qualified as a
reimbursement because the actual operating cost of the plane
was greater than $200.515 Thus, the court determined that the
issue was whether the use of Mr. Pond's airplane to transport
the Pond Family Skydivers to the jump site reasonably could be
considered incidental to the skydiving business.16
512 25 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 17,274 (D.N.H. Apr. 11, 1996).
513 Id. (alteration in original).





The court decided that "the phrase 'incidental to [the in-
sured's] business or job' could reasonably be understood to
cover any use of an insured's airplane that plays a minor or
subordinate role in comparison with the primary work for which
the insured is receiving compensation."51 7 The court deter-
mined that the present situation was such a case, and noted that
the use of an airplane is incidental to commercial skydiving, be-
cause although the skydiver must have an airplane to perform,
the skydiving itself was the primary activity for which the
skydiver was being compensated.51 For this reason, the court
found that the exclusion did not bar coverage.51 9
The plaintiff in American Eagle Insurance Co. v. Thompson 2 ° was
an insurance company that sought a determination that it had
no duty to defend or indemnify the defendant, a pilot, in two
state tort actions in Georgia. The insurance policy was issued to
Arkansas Air, a fixed-base operator in Jonesboro, Arkansas. De-
fendant Thompson occasionally flew planes for Arkansas Air.
He charged an hourly rate for his services and had no formal
employment relationship with Arkansas Air. In April 1993,
while flying a client of Arkansas Air from Jonesboro to Hilton
Head, South Carolina, Thompson crashed in Georgia, killing
Arkansas Air's client and the pilot of the other aircraft involved.
The insurance policy Arkansas Air had purchased from Amer-
ican Eagle provided that "bodily injury and property damage lia-
bility coverage protects you and any of your employees .... 521
The defendant claimed that he was an employee of Arkansas Air
at the time of the crash, whereas American Eagle claimed that
he was not.52 2 The trial court jury concluded that Thompson
was an employee and that he should be covered by the insur-
ance policy. American Eagle appealed the finding.523
The court reviewed the evidentiary record and found that
there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that
Thompson was an employee of Arkansas Air. 24 The key to this
finding was that Arkansas Air employees had directed Thomp-
son as to when the flight was to be flown, the departure and
517 Id.
518 See id. at 17,275-17,276.
519 See id.
520 85 F.3d 327 (8th Cir. 1996).
521 Id. at 329.
522 See id.
523 See id.
524 See id. at 330.
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arrival times of the flight, the particular aircraft to be flown, the
destination, and the particular number of passengers. 25
B. EFFECrivE CANCELLATION OF POuCY
The issue in Escobedo v. Estate of SnideP26 was what constituted
an insurance company's effective cancellation of an aviation lia-
bility insurance policy. Decedent Snider, as part of a condition
for maintaining his aircraft at an airport in California, was re-
quired to purchase liability insurance and furnish the county
with a certificate of such insurance. He purchased a non-com-
mercial aircraft policy from National Aviation Underwriters with
$100,000 of bodily injury coverage. The language of the policy
stated that it was effective from October 11, 1990, "until can-
celed." An additional endorsement attached to the insurance
contract provided that "[w] e [(National)] agree to mail 30 days
prior written notice to [the] addressee if we cancel this pol-
icy, " 527 with the addressee being the Venturi County Depart-
ment of Airports.
On September 12, 1992, National mailed a premium notice to
Snider warning that the policy would be canceled if his pre-
mium was not paid by October 12, 1992. On October 13, 1992,
National mailed a second notice to the decedent, which stated,
"[a]s noted on your premium due notice, your payment was due
on 10-12-92. Since no payment was received, your policy was
canceled as of that date."5 2 Eighteen days later, on October 30,
1992, the decedent and his passenger, Escobedo, were killed
when the Piper airplane crashed. Snider's estate then brought
suit attempting to enforce the insurance contract.
The issue before the court was whether the first cancellation
notice sent to the decedent was sufficient for National to deny
coverage or whether a second, additional cancellation notice
sent to the Venturi County Department of Airports was neces-
sary. The court scrutinized the policy in the context of the Uni-
form Aircraft Financial Responsibility Act (UAFRA) .529 The
court stated that "[i]n construing insurance contracts, doubts,
uncertainties, and ambiguities arising out of the policy language
are construed in favor of the insured to protect the insured's
525 See id.
526 25 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 17,185 (2d Cir. Feb. 20, 1996).
527 Id. (alterations in original).
528 Id.
529 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 24230 (West 1994).
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reasonable expectation of coverage."5 3 0 The court looked spe-
cifically to section 24361 of the UAFRA, which stated that "[n]o
insurance policy meeting the requirements of Section 24350
shall be canceled unless 30 days' prior notice is given to the de-
partment by either the insured or the insurance company. " 531
The court determined that "[t] he purpose of UAFRA is to estab-
lish minimum standards for aircraft financial responsibility."3 2
Following the UAFRA provisions, the court held that before Na-
tional was able to cancel its decedent's policy, section 24361 of
UAFRA required that a cancellation notice be mailed to the De-
partment of Aeronautics in California, as well as to the dece-
dent. 53  Thus, the court held that there had not been effective




The defendant in United States v. Rezaq53 5 was being prose-
cuted for aircraft piracy when he raised several motions related
to this prosecution. First, he maintained that the government
unlawfully manufactured an element of their case. A provision
in the aircraft piracy statute stated that the person must be "af-
terward found in the United States." 3 6 The defendant main-
tained that he was forcibly removed to the United States to stand
trial, and, thus, this element of the offense was missing.537 The
court, however, stated that the statutory language did not im-
pose a voluntary requirement on persons to stand trial and de-
nied this motion.3
The defendant next moved to strike surplusage from his in-
dictment. He sought to exclude language regarding murder
and attempted murder as irrelevant to the Anti-Hijacking Act.
The court found this issue to be moot, but even added that if it
were not, the plaintiff would not be entitled to have the lan-
guage struck based on the circuit's displeasure with this prac-
530 Escobedo, 25 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) at 17,186 (citation omitted).
531 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 24361 (West 1994).
532 Escobedo, 25 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) at 17,186 (citations omitted).
533 See id.
534 See id.
535 908 F. Supp. 6 (D.C.C. 1995).
536 49 U.S.C. § 1472.
5S7 See Rezag, 908 F. Supp. at 7.
538 See id. at 8.
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tice. 53 9 The court found that the language merely described
one of the elements. 540
The defendant's last motion was to bifurcate the trial. He
sought to separate the hijacking offenses from the murder and
attempted murder offenses. He maintained that if the jury
found him guilty of hijacking, then they should separately con-
sider whether force or intimidation was used.541 The court de-
nied this motion, stating that the jury must be made aware of
the full nature of the offenses charged. 42
The plaintiffs in Ackerman v. American Airlines, Inc.5 43 were for-
mer Braniff Airlines pilots who lost their jobs when that airline
went bankrupt. When they lost their jobs, they attempted to
find replacement jobs with other airlines, including American
Airlines, Northwest Airlines, and Delta Air Lines. When these
airlines did not hire them, they sued under the Employee Pro-
tection Program (EPP) of the Airline Deregulation Act.5 The
EPP was designed to provide job security for airline employees
in the uncertain times following airline deregulation. Under
the EPP, American was to give laid off pilots first hire rights, a
provision that the plaintiffs maintained was violated when Amer-
ican refused to hire them.
The defendant maintained that collateral estoppel should bar
this suit.545 They pointed to the prior litigation in Ackerman v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc.5 41 and Ackerman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.54 7 as
evidence that the plaintiffs' claims had already been litigated
fairly and fully.
The court ruled that the prior litigation precluded the plain-
tiff from relitigating the issues.548 The court held that the issue
was identical, the issue had been litigated, and that the issue was
a critical and necessary part of the previous judgments.549 Thus,
the plaintiffs' claims were barred by collateral estoppel.
539 See id. at 8-9.
540 See id. at 9.
541 See id.
542 See id. at 10.
543 924 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
5- 49 U.S.C § 42101 (1994).
545 See Ackerman v. American Airlines, 924 F. Supp. at 752.
546 54 F.3d 1389 (8th Cir. 1995).
547 900 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Ga. 1994).




The plaintiff in Hillay v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.550 filed a
negligence claim against TWA, alleging that an airline employee
dropped a metal box on her head. TWA moved for summary
judgment on the basis of res judicata. TWA maintained that a
Louisiana federal court dismissed a previous action by the plain-
tiff against TWA because the statute of limitations had run.551
After TWA moved for summary judgment, the plaintiff filed suit
in Missouri, alleging the same cause of action. The court found
"[t] hat final, valid judgment is now conclusive between the par-
ties under Louisiana law," so the court concluded that res judi-
cata barred the second suit.552
The plaintiff in Charles E. Smith Management, Inc. v. Department
of TaxationP55 hangared its aircraft at Washington National Air-
port. The Virginia Department of Taxation assessed the plain-
tiff an aircraft use tax in the amount of $300,000, a $75,000
penalty, and $34,000 in interest. The plaintiff paid the tax and
then appealed, alleging that Virginia was without the power to
tax because the state had no power to license aircraft based at
Washington National Airport since it is located in the federal
enclave of the District of Columbia. Virginia responded that the
power to license aircraft was within its police power.
The court decided the issue by considering the scope of the
police power given to Virginia over Washington National Air-
port.554 "[W]e think that the licensure of aircraft is clearly an
exercise of the Commonwealth's police power."5 5 Thus, the tax
was upheld.
B. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
The plaintiffs in Roman v. Aviateca, S.A. 556 were citizens of Nic-
aragua who were passengers aboard a Guatemalan aircraft that
crashed in El Salvador in 1995. Plaintiffs claimed that the
United States District Court in Texas was without subject matter
jurisdiction to hear this case.557 Defendant claimed that there
was federal question jurisdiction based on questions of foreign
550 930 F. Supp. 1332 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
55' See id. at 1334.
552 Id. at 1335.
5-1 467 S.E.2d 772 (Va. 1996).
554 See id. at 774.
555 Id.
556 25 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 17,293 (S.D. Tex. May 22, 1996).
557 See id.
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relations and the treaties of the United States. 5 8 Texas law per-
mits a citizen of a foreign country to file suit in Texas if the
foreign country has "equal treaty rights" with the United
States.559
The court stated that "[d ]letermination of whether [p]laintiffs
have standing to proceed under § 71.031 requires consideration
of treaties between the United States and the foreign country
and, therefore, provides a basis for federal question jurisdic-
tion."5 60 The court thus granted the defendant's motion to dis-
miss for lack of standing.
VIII. EVIDENCE
The defendant in Daniels v. Tew Mac Aero Services, Inc.5 61 was
an aircraft service company that had overhauled the engine and
carburetor of a Cessna 182K aircraft. The aircraft later crashed
on a flight meant to "break in" the recently overhauled engine.
The plaintiff, John Daniels, had piloted the break-in flight.
After the accident, the plane was inspected by the FAA.
Before the trial, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion in
limine to exclude from evidence any part of the FAA accident
report. Tew Mac, after losing at the trial court level, appealed
claiming that the exclusion of the FAA action report prevented
it from presenting its theory of the case. Tew Mac argued that
the portion of the Federal Aviation Act562 used as the basis for
excluding the accident report must be construed narrowly. 563
Section 1441(e) provided that "[n]o part of any report or re-
ports of the National Transportation Safety Board relating to
any accident or the investigation thereof, shall be admitted as
evidence or used in any suit or action for damages growing out
of any matter mentioned in such report or reports."564 Tew Mac
claimed that a narrow interpretation of the statute was consis-
tent with the National Transportation Safety Board's practice of
generating two reports, a factual report and a probable cause
558 See id.
-59 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.031 (Vernon 1994).
560 Roman, 25 Av. L. Rep. at 17,293.
561 675 A.2d 984 (Me. 1996).
562 49 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (repealed 1994 by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 757
(1994)).




report.565 Tew Mac argued that the factual report should have
been admitted.
The court analyzed the treatment of the NTSB factual reports
in the federal courts and found the courts to be in disagree-
ment.566 However, the majority view supported the use of the
factual reports, concluding that the purpose of the statutory bar
is "to prevent usurpation of the jury's role as the factfinder, a
purpose fully served by excluding from evidence the opinions or
conclusions regarding the probable cause of accidents [the
probable cause report] ."167 The court could find little support
for excluding both the factual report and the probable cause
report.5 6 8 The court concluded that the legislative intent of sec-
tion 1441 was "twofold: to keep the board from becoming em-
broiled in civil litigation and to prevent a usurpation of the
factfinder's role. Permitting factual portions of the board's acci-
dent investigation does not defeat either of these purposes." 69
The court thus concluded that the trial court's exclusion of both
reports was erroneous.5 7 0 The court, however, was still left to
decide whether the portions of the report were acceptable
under the Maine Rules of Evidence.
The court examined the nature of the report as a public
records and reports exception to the hearsay rule. The court
stated that "[t]he safety board report is therefore a report of a
public agency setting forth matters observed pursuant to a duty
imposed by law as to which there is a duty to report."571 The
plaintiff argued that Maine Rule of Evidence 803(8) (B) (iv),
which excludes factual findings from a special investigation of a
particular complaint, case, or incident, applied. The court,
however, thought that this rule did not apply because the NTSB
investigated all civil aircraft accidents, so it was not a special in-
vestigation. 73 Thus, the court held that the reports were accept-
able under the Maine Rules of Evidence and vacated the lower




56 See id. at 988.
56 Id.
570 See id.
571 Id. at 989.
572 See id.
573 See id. at 990.
574 See id. at 990-91.
1997]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
IX. CONSTITUTION
The Supreme Court, in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities
Inc.,5"5 decided whether a state statute requiring a review ofjury
verdicts for excessiveness could be recognized in federal court
without violating the Seventh Amendment. The Seventh
Amendment states that no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
re-examined in any other court of the United States according
to the rules of the common law.576 The state statute in question
was a New York law, New York Civil Practice Law and Rules
5501 (c), which states that the appellate court is to review the
size of jury verdicts and order a new trial when the award is ex-
cessive.577 The Supreme Court stated that appellate review of
such jury verdicts, when limited to issues of the abuse of discre-
tion, is reconcilable with the Seventh Amendment for purposes
of judicial economy. 8
X. IMMIGRATION
The dispute in Linea Area Nacional de Chile, S.A. v. Meissne r 7 9
arose when passengers traveling on a Linea Area Nacional de
Chile (LAN) aircraft arrived at John F. Kennedy Airport in New
York as a stopover on a flight to Seoul, South Korea, and re-
quested political asylum. The issue was whether the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS) or the airline was to
assume physical and financial responsibility for the aliens pend-
ing determination of their asylum requests.
The INS relied on an agreement between the agency and the
airline enabling LAN to bring into the United States undocu-
mented aliens, allowing them to enter this country as part of a
stopover on a longer flight.580 The airline relied on amend-
ments made in 1986 to the Immigration and Naturalization Act
(INA), which repealed previous sections of the Act requiring air-
lines to assume physical and financial responsibility in cases
such as this. 581
The court stated that the principal question was whether Con-
gress's intent in amending the INA in 1986 was to shift from the
575 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996).
576 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
577 See N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995).
578 See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2223-24.
57 65 F.3d 1034 (2d Cir. 1995).
580 See id. at 1036.
581 See id. at 1037.
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airlines to the INS the burdens incurred by safeguarding passen-
gers seeking asylum.582 After determining that the aliens in this
case were the sort of aliens which fell within the scope of the
INA amendment, the court stated that, "This statute makes clear
that INS must expend funds on detention and deportation of
excludable aliens."5 83 The INS maintained that a section of the
INA that was left unmodified by the 1986 amendments permit-
ted it to continue to contract with carriers to make them respon-
sible for the detention of aliens seeking asylum. 84 The court,
however, stated that Congress did not modify that provision of
the INA because the scope of that section was limited to the
time during a routine layover as opposed to a situation where a
passenger seeks asylum. 85
The court then turned to whether the INS could rely on sov-
ereign immunity to deny relief to the airline. The court dis-
missed this argument, stating, "[I] t is clear that Congress also
intended that INS reimburse carriers for the expenses they in-
curred as a result of congressionally-repudiated INS policy."5 86
The court, thus, held for LAN.
The case of Aerolineas Argentinas v. United States58 7 was similar
to Linea Area Nacional de Chile v. Meissne 18 8 in that it dealt with
the question of who was to bear the expenses of asylum-seeking
aliens arriving on foreign airlines. The facts were similar to the
previous case in that the airline transported aliens to the United
States with the intermediate point of New York City as a stopover
from Argentina to Hong Kong. When the aliens requested asy-
lum, the INS declined to assume custody, and instead ordered
the airline to provide and care for the aliens until the comple-
tion of the asylum hearings. The cost to Aerolineas Argentinas
for these services was $162,000.
The court in this case looked to the 1986 immigration user
fee statute that changed the long-standing policy of forcing air-
lines to care for asylum-seeking aliens during the time of their
asylum hearings. 58 9 The 1986 amendment provided that the
INS would be responsible for detaining aliens pending asylum
582 See id. at 1039.
583 Id. at 1040.
584 See id.
58 See id.
58 Id. at 1043.
587 77 F.3d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
588 65 F.3d 1034 (2d Cir. 1995).
589 See Aerolineas Argentinas, 77 F.3d at 1571.
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procedures and that the cost of doing so would be funded by a
surcharge on tickets for entering international passengers col-
lected by the carrier at the port of embarkation. 9 ' The court
stated, "The legislative intention to relieve the airlines of the
custodial role for aliens awaiting asylum determination is clearly
stated, and the statute's plain meaning directly implements that
intention."591 The court held that the Tucker Act was the juris-
dictional vehicle for the airlines to use to recover the fees paid
while caring for the aliens. 92
XI. AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT/PREEMPTION
A. GOVERNMENT ORDINANCES/REGULATIONS
The litigation in Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus593 arose when
the plaintiff attempted to fly his seaplane on the town's lake.
Lake Angelus ordinances prohibited the operation of such sea
planes and ordered the plaintiff to stop flying. The plaintiff
filed suit, claiming that the Federal Aviation Act preempted the
town ordinances,594 and that the enforcement of the ordinances
was a violation of his equal protection and due process rights.
The court found that federal law did not preempt the city or-
dinances because "there is a distinction between the regulation
of the navigable airspace and the regulation of ground space to
be used for aircraft landing sites."5 95 Although the plaintiff at-
tempted to construe the Federal Aviation Act broadly, the court
found that "[fiederal preemption of the airspace under the
[Federal Aviation Act] does not limit the right of the local gov-
ernments to designate and regulate aircraft landing areas, in-
cluding seaplane landing areas on lakes."
596
The court next addressed the plaintiff's equal protection and
due process claims. The court listed the town's safety-related
reasons for prohibiting seaplane operations on the lake and
then found that the ordinance was reasonable because there was
590 See INA, 286 U.S.C. § 1356 (1994).
591 Aerolineas Argentinas, 77 F.3d at 1571.
592 See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994 & Supp. 1997). See also Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v.
Reno, 80 F.3d 477, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (carriers are not required by regulation,
contract, or otherwise to pay the detention expenses in the absence of a statute
imposing the duty).
593 76 F.3d 778 (6th Cir. 1996).
59 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-41901 (1994).
595 Gustafson, 76 F.3d at 789.
59 Id. at 790.
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no "basis on which to find that the... [ordinances are] arbitrary
or unreasonable.
597
The plaintiff in Huntleigh Corp. v. Louisiana State Board of Pri-
vate Security Examiners98 was a company that contracted with air-
lines to perform pre-departure screenings at airports. The
Board of Private Security Examiners stated that the plaintiff vio-
lated the Louisiana Private Security Regulations and Licensing
Law5 99 and the board's rules regarding the registering and train-
ing of private security officers. Huntleigh appealed, asserting
that the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) prohibited states from
enforcing state regulations with regard to security services be-
cause the ADA and the Federal Aviation Administration Author-
ization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) preempted the state regulations.
The court agreed with the plaintiff stating that "[t]he Louisiana
Private Security Regulatory and Licensing Law is a specific law
which affects the 'services' of air carriers, and is within the reach
of the preemptive provisions of the ADA and FAAAA." 600 The
court continued, stating that "[t]o allow each state to prescribe
the qualifications and training of employees of the airlines or of
those with whom the airlines contract to perform such security
screening would frustrate the uniformity of the training stan-
dards and employee qualifications, and thus conflict with the
federal scheme."60 1 The court concluded that it did not matter
that the plaintiff was a security company rather than an air car-
rier because the company was an agent for the air carrier for
which it performed services.6"2
The plaintiff in Price v. Charter Township of Fenton6°3 owned a
private airport in the town of Fenton. After a commercial oper-
ation began flying World War II vintage airplanes out of the air-
port, the town, in response to citizen complaints concerning
noise, passed an ordinance limiting the frequency of flights
from the airport. The plaintiff filed suit challenging the consti-
tutionality of the ordinance, maintaining that federal aviation
law preempted the ordinance. More specifically, the plaintiff as-
597 Id. at 791.
598 906 F. Supp. 357 (M.D. La. 1995).
599 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:3270 (West 1988).
6-0 Huntleigh, 906 F. Supp. at 361.
601 Id.
602 See id. at 362.
603 909 F. Supp. 498 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
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serted that the ordinance was preempted by the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958.604
The court looked to the Supreme Court's decision in City of
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal,60 5 where it held that a town or-
dinance prohibiting flights after 11:00 p.m. was preempted by
federal law.6 °6 The Federal District Court found that if an ordi-
nance regarding the timing of flights was preempted, an ordi-
nance regarding the frequency of flights was also preempted. °7
B. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The United States Supreme Court, in Medtronic v. Lohr, °8 de-
cided the question of whether federal law expressly preempted
products liability claims against makers of medical devices. The
court found that the process of pre-market approval of Class 3
medical devices was an additional requirement that is pre-
empted by federal law. Such devices were exempted from the
approval process because they are "substantially equivalent" to
pre-existing devices and do not require approval until the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) initiates an approval process."°9
The plaintiff in Medtronic suffered damages when a pacemaker
malfunctioned. The product had been found by the FDA to be
"substantially equivalent" and, thus, did not have to go through
the pre-market approval process.610 The plaintiff alleged prod-
ucts liability claims against the manufacturer for negligent de-
sign, negligent manufacturing, and failure to warn about the
product's defects. 61 I The court concluded that such state law
negligence actions were not the sort of state law action that Con-
gress intended federal law to preempt.61 2 The court illustrated
the problem as the state law damage remedy not being an addi-
tional requirement but as an additional incentive for manufac-
turers to comply with existing federal rules that regulate the
manufacturers' products. 615
604 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1557 (1994).
605 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
6w See id. at 638.
607 See Price, 909 F. Supp. at 502.
608 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
&09 See id. at 2254.
610 See id.
611 See id. at 2248.
612 See id. at 2258.




The plaintiff in Seals v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.614 filed suit alleging
contract and negligence claims based on Delta's failure to pro-
vide ground transportation between gates at Dallas/Fort Worth
International Airport. Delta raised three theories in its motion
for summary judgment. First, Delta maintained that under Ten-
nessee and Texas comparative negligence laws, no reasonable
jury would find for the plaintiff. The court rejected this theory,
declining to decide what a jury might do.615 Second, Delta
maintained that no contract existed between Delta and the
plaintiff. The court also refused to accept this theory, stating
that reasonable questions of fact existed as to whether a contract
existed. 61 6 Third, Delta maintained that the Airline Deregula-
tion Act (ADA) preempted the contract and negligence claims.
In addressing this third theory, the court followed the recent
case of American Airlines v. Wolens,61 7 in which the Supreme
Court held that the ADA did not preempt a breach of contract
action brought under state law, stating that there is room for
"court enforcement of contract terms set by the parties
themselves. "618
In analyzing the negligence claim, the federal district court in
Seals noted that the courts had split on whether the ADA pre-
empted such claims. 619 The court's analysis of dicta in Wolens,
revealed that the Supreme Court did not hold that the ADA pre-
empted personal injury suits. 620 The district court observed that
"[e]ven Justice O'Connor, who espouses the broadest interpre-
tation of the preemption clause, would allow such suits to con-
tinue on the theory that such safety concerns do not 'relate' to
provisions of 'services' by carmers. The Seals court also found
guidance in Justice Stevens's opinion that Congress surely did
not intend to either leave passengers without remedy for a per-
sonal injury action, or to turn the Department of Transportation
into a forum for adjudicating personal claims. 62 2 Thus, the
614 924 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Tenn. 1996).
61-5 See id. at 857.
616 See id.
617 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
618 Id. at 222.
619 See Seals 924 F. Supp. at 854.
620 See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 231.
621 Seals, 924 F. Supp. at 859.
622 See id.
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County of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, Connecticut24 in-
volved the Westchester County Airport, whose New York prop-
erty bordered the New York-Connecticut state line, and the
Convent of the Sacred Heart, located in Connecticut and bor-
dering the airport property. Trees, which were small and unob-
trusive in 1942 when the airport was built for military use, had
grown to a height that impinged on the glide slope for runway
11/29. The usable length of the runway had been reduced from
4450 feet to 1350 feet because of the extreme angle of descent
that was required to land on the runway over the trees. The
operators of the airport instituted various legal actions through-
out the years against the Convent and the state of Connecticut
in an attempt to cut down the trees so that the runway could be
used in its full capacity. However, the operators lost at every
level. The final attempt to shorten the trees was framed as a
public nuisance action against the defendants. The District
Court granted the Convent's summary judgment motion, and
this case was a review of that decision.
The court stated that for the County of Westchester to prevail,
it must establish that some offensive or obstructive condition in-
terfered with a right common to the general public.625 In addi-
tion, the county was required to prove that "(1) the condition
complained of has a natural tendency to create danger and in-
flict injury upon persons or property, (2) the danger is a contin-
uing one, (3) the use of the land is unreasonable or unlawful,
and (4) the existence of a nuisance is the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries and damages." 626
The court of appeals, in determining the reasonableness of
the use of land (for example, growing trees, as in this case), bal-
623 See also Travel All Over The World, Inc. v. Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423 (7th
Cir. 1996); Capacchione v. Qantas, 25 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 17,346 (C.D. Ca.
1996); Trinidad v. American Airlines, 932 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Conti-
nental Airlines v. Shupe, 920 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. 1995); Johnson v. American Air-
lines, 663 N.E.2d 54 (Ill. App. 1996). See also Musson Theatrical v. Federal
Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244 (6th Cir. 1996).
624 76 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 1996).




anced the competing interests of the plaintiff and the defend-
ant. The court stated, "[c] ommon sense dictates that the quite
ordinary activity of growing trees on one's land is, without more,
presumptively reasonable."627 The court quoted the United
States Supreme Court in saying, "the use of land presupposes
the use of some of the airspace above it .... Otherwise, no
home could be built, no tree planted, no fence constructed, no
chimney erected."628
Balanced with the plaintiffs interest was the county's interest
in raising the existing level of operations at its airport. The
court did not favor the county's interest because, as it pointed
out, the airport began operations without securing the property
rights necessary to achieve that desired level of operations. 629
The court cited Griggs, in which the Supreme Court noted that a
"local airport owner is as responsible 'for the air easements nec-
essary for operation of the airport [as it is for] the land on which
the runways were built."6 3 0 In an attempt to better illustrate the
point in this case, the court of appeals quoted the lower court's
opinion:
[i]f normally unobjectionable land use such as growing trees can
be transformed into an "unreasonable" activity by the act of
building an airport that lacks the necessary property rights for
full operation, then there would be no reason for airports to ever
bother paying for property rights beyond those needed for the
land the airport actually occupies, because the airports could ac-
quire the air easements they needed without cost by bringing
nuisance suits against any landowner whose property contained
structures blocking or threatening to block, the airports' "run-
ways" clear zones. 3 1
Because the plaintiff was unable to establish the unreasonable
or unlawful element necessary for a public nuisance claim, the
court held for the defendant.632
627 Id. at 45 n.1.
628 Id. at 45 (quoting Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 89 (1962)).
629 See id.
630 Id. (quoting Griggs, 369 U.S. at 89).
631 County of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, Conn., 870 F. Supp. 496, 505
n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
632 See id. at 505.
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B. LESSEES
The plaintiff in Metropolitan Express Services, Inc. v. City of Kan-
sas City, Missouri3 33 was an airport grounds transportation com-
pany operating out of the Kansas City Airport. The company
discontinued its services as a result of what later became an ille-
gal exclusive concession agreement between a competitor and
the city. The plaintiff sued seeking lost profit damages. The
court did not award the lost profits because the plaintiff failed to
show previous profits necessary to satisfy Missouri's strict stan-
dard for recovering lost profits. 63 4
C. USER FEES
The controversy in Era Aviation, Inc. v. Campbell 35 originated
when the Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facil-
ities promulgated a regulation which increased landing fees at
Alaska's rural airports. In 1991, several air carriers (not parties
to the present action) filed suit alleging that the regulation was
illegal and requesting injunctive relief and a refund of the land-
ing fees previously paid. In 1993, the Alaska Superior Court
granted summary judgment to those plaintiffs on the basis that
the regulation did not comply with the Alaska Administrative
Procedure Act and was, thus, invalid and unenforceable. The
court enjoined the department from collecting any more fees
under the regulation. Four days before this ruling, Alaska Air-
lines, Aleutian Airways, Northern Air Cargo, and Peninsula Air-
ways moved to intervene in the litigation. The court granted
their motion. The department requested the opportunity to
later assert new defenses against the four new plaintiffs' claims
for previously paid landing fees. Later in 1993, Era Aviation
filed a separate lawsuit to recover landing fees it had previously
paid. The court consolidated this action with the one brought
by the intervenors. At this point, the department moved for
summary judgment, which the court granted, holding that the
intervenors and Era Aviation were required to protest the land-
ing fees when they paid them, and they failed to do so. Also, the
court held that the equal protection clause of the Alaska Consti-
tution did not require that refunds be paid out to all carriers,
even though refunds had been paid to the original plaintiffs in
633 71 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1995).
634 See id. at 275.
635 915 P.2d 606 (Alaska 1996).
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the action.63 6 The intervenors and Era Aviation appealed the
decision.
The Era Aviation court determined that the dispute revolved
around whether an action in assumpsit required a protest at the
time of payment, or whether such a protest applied only to tax
payments and not user fees.63 7 The court reviewed the law of
assumpsit in Alaska and held that "under common law, as well as
under statute, a protest at the time of payment is a prerequisite
for an action to recover taxes."638 The court concluded that the
requirement of a formal protest at the time of payment applied
to all actions in assumpsit brought against a government en-
tity.63 9 It reasoned that such a rule is beneficial because it estab-
lishes a uniform requirement for all actions in assumpsit in
Alaska.'
The court then answered the question of whether the air car-
riers protested the regulation at the time of payment. The court
disregarded the air carriers' argument that they had protested
by way of lobbying extensively before the department and the
Alaskan legislature in an attempt to prevent the adoption of the
regulation.641 The court stated, "However, . . . virtually every
regulation or statute is opposed by some subset of the polity."64 2
The court held that such lobbying did not provide adequate no-
tice to the government that the carriers might someday sue and
seek a refund of the monies they had paid.643 The court stated
that for a party to later bring an action in assumpsit, the payer
must specifically "notify the State" that it intends to seek reim-
bursement.6" "Because there is no evidence in the record that
such notice was given, summary judgment was proper. "645
The air carriers lastly argued that reimbursing the original
plaintiffs while denying them repayment violated the equal pro-
tection clause of the Alaskan Constitution.6 The court found a
strong distinction between protesting and non-protesting payers
636 See id. at 613.
.637 See id.
638 Id.
639 See id. at 611.
640 See id.
64 See id. at 612.
642 Id.
643 See id.
64 Id. at 611.
65 Id. at 612.
w See id. at 613.
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of the landing fee, and, thus, found no equal protection viola-
tion.647 The court affirmed the lower court's judgment.
D. TAKINGS CASES
The plaintiff in the case of National By-Products, Inc. v. City oJ
Little Rock" 8 was an animal by-products rendering plant. Plain-
tiff's facility was located between the north end of one of Little
Rock Airport's runways and the south bank of the Arkansas
River. According to the plaintiff, the Little Rock Regional Air-
port Commission began planning in 1985 to acquire the prop-
erty for noise mitigation purposes. Later, this plan expanded to
include lengthening the runway. In attempting to acquire the
plaintiff's plant, the commission applied for FAA funds. The
commission appraised the plaintiff's property and acquired all
residential properties in the area. The commission released de-
tails of the runway extension plan to the media, and filed and
recorded project maps about the project with the FAA.
As a result of the publicity surrounding the possible future
acquisition of National By-Product's rendering plant, its compet-
itors approached the plaintiffs customers and informed them of
the possibility that the plaintiff might have to move and close its
operations. As a result, plaintiff lost customers and profits. The
plaintiff filed suit for inverse condemnation, claiming that the
commission's actions of publicizing the commission's intent to
acquire the property substantially deprived the plaintiff of its use
and enjoyment of its property. Therefore, the property was ren-
dered unfit for its highest and best commercial use. The unfit-
ness for commercial use of the plaintiffs property was caused by
its competitors' actions rather than the direct result of the com-
mission's actions.
On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court defined "inverse
condemnation" as "a cause of action against a governmental de-
fendant to recover the value of property which has been taken
in fact by a governmental entity although not through eminent
domain procedures."649 However, the court noted, "it has been
held that damages for loss of business and depreciation of prop-
erty resulting from the condemnation of adjacent land are non-
compensable where there is no interference with possession,
647 See id.
648 916 S.W.2d 745 (Ark. 1996).
649 Id. at 747.
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use, or enjoyment of such land."650 The court then quoted the
United States Supreme Court, which stated that "[a] reduction
or increase in the value of property may occur by reason of legis-
lation for or the beginning or completion of a project. Such
changes in value are incidents of ownership. They cannot be
considered as a 'taking' in the constitutional sense. "651
In reaching its conclusion, the Arkansas Supreme Court de-
cided to follow the general rule in many jurisdictions that the
"mere plotting or planning in anticipation of an improvement
does not constitute a taking or damaging of the property af-
fected where the government has not imposed a restraint on the
use of the property."652 The court determined that prohibiting
such causes of action allows governments to plan public works
projects without the specter of lawsuits hanging over their
heads.653 Such a threat might encourage the government to
keep such projects secret, to limit public input as to the projects,
and to forestall any meaningful review of environmental conse-
quences.6 5 Based upon this definition of inverse condemna-
tion, the court found that the plaintiff had no cause of action
because the property continued to be used as a rendering plant
and, as such, the plaintiff suffered no damages that could be
compensable under an inverse condemnation lawsuit.
655
The issue in Jackson v. Metropolitan Knoxville Airport Authority
65P
was whether a cause of action existed for inverse condemnation
where the use and enjoyment of property was disturbed by noise
vibration and pollutants from airplanes that flew near, but not
directly over, the plaintiff's property. The defendant claimed
that there was no action for inverse condemnation because
plaintiff did not allege a physical invasion of property, which in
this case would require an allegation of direct overflight.
65 7
The Tennessee Supreme Court relied on Thornburg v. Port of
Portland,58 in which the Oregon Supreme Court held that sys-
tematic flights that passed close to private land, but not directly
650 Id. at 748 (citation omitted).
651 Id. (quoting Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939)).
652 National By-Products, 916 S.W.2d. at 749.




656 922 S.W.2d 860 (Tenn. 1996).
657 See id. at 862.
6 376 P.2d 100 (Or. 1962).
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overhead, constituted a taking.659 The Tennessee court con-
cluded, "Obviously, continuous noise, pollutants and vibration
from planes flying nearby can interfere with a property owner's
beneficial use and enjoyment just as surely as noise, pollutants
and vibration from planes flying directly overhead."660 The
court adopted the view that direct overflight was not a require-
ment to establish a prima facie case for inverse
condemnation.66'
The Tennessee court then defined a standard to be applied
by juries in determining whether a compensable taking had oc-
curred. Relying again on Thornburg, the court adopted a private
nuisance standard, stating that the plaintiff must show a re-
peated, direct, and substantial interference that uniquely affects
the beneficial use and enjoyment of the property at issue.662
The plaintiffs in Lopez-Aponte v. Columbus Airport Commission663
challenged the Columbus Airport Commission's (CAC) ability
to condemn their property for an aviation easement. The court
analyzed the Georgia law of eminent domain and stated, "It is
clear that the power of eminent domain was not expressly
granted to CAC by the legislature, but remained with [the
county]. All other methods of acquiring property were ex-
pressly granted to CAC by the legislature."6 4 The CAC relied
on the power of eminent domain to acquire property when the
CAC claimed the power to condemn the plaintiffs property.
However, the court did not agree that such power had been
granted to the CAC. "Had the legislature intended to grant di-
rectly to CAC the power of eminent domain, it could easily have
done so expressly." 665
The CAC then argued that since it was an independent polit-
ical subdivision of the state of Georgia, it had the authority to
condemn property for airport purposes pursuant to the Georgia
statute section 6-3-22.66 The court found otherwise, however,
stating that the statute "does not independently grant the power
of eminent domain to any entity. It simply provides that con-
demnation may be used to obtain title to property for airport
659 SeeJackson, 972 S.W.2d at 862.
660 Id. at 864.
661 See id.
662 See id.
663 473 S.E.2d 196 (Ga. App. 1996).
66 Id. at 198.
665 Id. at 199.
666 See id.
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purposes where such action is otherwise authorized by the entity
seeking title."66 7
The plaintiffs in Fullerton v. Knox County Commissioners6s were
land owners whose property was taken as an aviation easement
for the expansion of the Knox County Regional Airport. The
lower court determined that the taking amounted to a direct
and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the
plaintiffs' property and awarded the plaintiffs the fair market
value of their property, $165,000, less the amount already paid
for the easements, for a net compensation of $130,000. The
plaintiffs appealed to the Maine Supreme Court, arguing that
the lower court failed to award prejudgment and post judgment
interest.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, in another case address-
ing government takings, held that plaintiffs were entitled to the
interest from the date of taking:
Article I, § 21 of the Constitution of Maine, providing [that] "pri-
vate property shall not be taken for public uses without just com-
pensation," constitutionally mandates payment of interest from
the date of takin in order that the property owner receive "just
compensation. 69
Because the lower court held that the taking of the easements
amounted to a direct and immediate interference with the
plaintiffs' enjoyment and use of their property, the Maine
Supreme Court held that plaintiffs were entitled to the interest
from the date of taking.6
In Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Co. v. Metropoli-
tan Washington Airports Authority,671 a railroad-owned property
adjacent to Washington National Airport was the disputed prop-
erty. Seventeen acres of the property lay within the clear zone
of the airport's runway 15/33. A clear zone, as defined by the
FAA, prohibited any development that would attract a "congre-
gation of people." Plaintiff alleged that the Metropolitan Wash-
ington Airport Authority (Authority), an interstate entity with
the responsibility of operating Washington National Airport and
Washington Dulles International Airport with the availability of
eminent domain to carry out those operations, engaged in in-
667 Id.
,68 672 A.2d 592 (Me. 1996).
669 Id. (quoting Milstar Mfg. Corp. v. Waterfield Urban Renewal Auth., 351
A.2d 538, 544 (Me. 1976) (citation omitted)).
670 See id. at 594.
671 468 S.E.2d 90 (Va. 1996).
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verse condemnation. The Authority made an agreement with
the FAA to either acquire the clear zone area or obtain an avia-
tion easement.
The plaintiff lost at the trial court level and appealed, claim-
ing that the trial court erred in holding that the Authority did
nothing to take or to damage the plaintiffs property within the
meaning of the takings clause in the Virginia Constitution. The
Virginia Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiffs claim that the
Authority's actions prevented the plaintiff from developing the
property in question. The court pointed out that the Authority
had resisted pressure from the FAA to acquire the clear zone
property.12 Additionally, the court found that the Authority did
not take the plaintiff's land when the authority used it either for
overflights or as a runway protection zone. 673 The court quoted
the United States Supreme Court's holding that "[f]lights over
private land are not a taking unless they are so low and so fre-
quent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the en-
joyment and use of the land."674 The court found that an
invasion of the plaintiffs airspace rights had not occurred. 5
The litigation in City of Iowa City v. Hagen Electronics, Inc.6 76
arose when Iowa City substituted Runway 6/24 for Runway 17/
35 as the airport's primary runway, and extended Runway 6/24
by 355 feet. This change and extension infringed upon the
plaintiffs neighboring property height limitations and zoning
ordinance restrictions. The plaintiff filed suit contesting the
city's authority to impose these restrictions.
The court determined that the plaintiff did not exhaust all
available administrative remedies before resorting to litiga-
tion. 7 The plaintiff maintained that he failed to do so because
any administrative remedies would have been inadequate and
the pursuit would have been futile .6 78 The court disagreed, how-
ever, stating that "[o]ther evidence in the record leads us to
conclude that the outcome at the administrative level may well
have been different had [plaintiff] pursued his available reme-
dies."679 The court concluded that "[i]n the absence of proof
672 See id. at 97.
673 See id.
674 Id. (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946)).
675 See id.
676 545 N.W.2d 530 (Iowa 1996).
677 See id. at 534.
678 See id.
679 Id. at 535.
164
AVIATION LAW DEVELOPMENTS
that a landowner has pursued all statutorily available avenues for
challenging zoning decisions, a reviewing court is in no position
to determine whether the landowner has, in fact, been denied
just compensation based on an alleged regulatory taking."680
The court dismissed the plaintiff's substantive due process argu-
ment, and stated that the city had a rational basis for adopting
the ordinances. 81
The plaintiffs in Watson v. City of Atlanta6d 2 owned apartment
units located near Hartsfield International Airport, which is
owned by the city of Atlanta. The city attempted to reduce land
uses incompatible with the amount of noise generated at Harts-
field by creating a program in which they bought single-family
residential property near the airport. The city chose not to buy
back the plaintiffs' property (multi-family units) on the basis
that apartment dwellers found excessive noise less objectionable
than single-family unit dwellers. The plaintiffs then brought an
action for nuisance and inverse condemnation.
The plaintiffs maintained that the city's decision was arbitrary,
capricious and irrational and that the decision violated their
equal protection rights. 683 The court found no facts to support
the distinction between single family and multi family units.
684
It held that the line drawn between the two was done with no
objective reason, and, thus, denied the plaintiffs arguments. 685
The plaintiffs in Southfund Partners v. City of Atlanta8 6 owned
land near Atlanta's Hartsfield International Airport. They filed
suit against the city of Atlanta claiming that alterations in flight
patterns and an increase in noise over the property since it was
purchased have made the property unmarketable. The trial
court found that the claims were time barred because they were
brought more than four years after the alleged taking and dam-
ages were apparent.6 8 7
The court first determined that the plaintiffs claims were gov-
erned by the four-year statute of limitation for trespassing under
Georgia law.6 8 Because the plaintiffs complaint was filed on
680 Id.
1 See id. at 536.
682 466 S.E.2d 229 (Ga. App. 1995).
683 See id. at 231.
684 See id. at 232.
685 See id.
686 472 S.E.2d 499 (Ga. App. 1996).
687 See id. at 500.
6N See id. at 501.
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September 28, 1994, the cause of action must have accrued after
September 28, 1990, for the statute of limitation to take ef-
fect.689 The city of Atlanta presented evidence demonstrating
that there had been an increase in quieter planes over the plain-
tiffs property since 1990, and that the total number of flights
had not increased since 1990. The court concluded:
The [c]ity's evidence as to the frequency of flights, flight pat-
terns, and reduction in numbers of flights of Stage 2 aircraft, is
sufficient to show there has been no increase in the nuisance
over [the plaintiffs] property and, if [plaintiff] had a cause of
action, it accrued more than four years prior to the date of filing
of their complaint.69 °
The plaintiff then argued that its cause of action did not ac-
crue until it was denied compensation for the taking.69 ' The
court disagreed, stating, "we find the moment of taking to be
the time when the runways became operational and the injury
became immediately apparent .. , this is still outside the four
year statute of limitation."692
The plaintiff then argued that the statute of limitations did
not apply because the airport is a continuing nuisance, and,
thus, the statute of limitations should run with each fresh occur-
rence of the nuisance.693 The court dismissed this claim, find-






693 See id. at 501-02.
694 See id. at 502.
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